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PHYSICIAN RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS: THE
NEGLECT OF INCUMBENT PATIENT INTERESTS
S. Elizabeth Wilborn Malloy*

I.

INTRODUCTION

The physician-patient relationship is unique in our society.
Physicians! help safeguard one of the most important of human
needs-health and well-being. Unfortunately, many physicians
must balance the sometimes competing aims of providing
personalized, high-quality care to their patients and running a
profitable business. This tension is clearly evident in the current
2
battles over the legality of physician restrictive covenants.
Those entities that employ physicians-such as Health
Maintenance Organizations 3 ("HMOs"), hospitals, and practice
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William & Mary, 1988. I thank Matt Malloy for his generous engagement with
my work; Heather Lutz, Drew Brinkman, and Chris Kuhnhein for their
excellent and resourceful research assistance; Jim Tomaszewski and Kevin
Guerrero for their editing assistance; and the UC Law librarians for locating
and obtaining materials.
1. For the purposes of this Article, the term physician encompasses those
persons courts define as physicians-all those licensed to practice medicine.
Although this Article focuses on restrictive covenants as applied to physicians,
the trend among courts appears to broaden the range of health care providers
who are subject to such restrictive covenants, including nurse practitioners,
physical therapists, medical technicians, and other health care professionals.
See James W. Lowry, Covenants-not-to-compete in Physician Contracts: Recent
Trends Defining Reasonableness at Common Law, 24 J. LEGAL MED. 215, 232
(2003).
2. Throughout this Article, the terms "restrictive covenant", "noncompete
agreement", and "covenant-not-to-compete" will be used interchangeably. The
terms refer to a clause in an employment contract that restricts the right of the
physician to practice medicine within a specified geographic area for a specific
amount of time after terminating employment. See BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY
392 (8th ed. 2004); 6 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE
LAw OF CONTRACTS §13:1 (4th ed. 1995).
3. An HMO is one type of prepaid medical service in which members pay a
monthly fee for all health care, including doctors' visits, emergency care,
hospitalization, lab tests, x-rays, surgery, and therapy. BARRY R. FURROW ET
AL., HEALTH LAw §11-11 (1995).
189
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groups-often protect their business interests by using restrictive
4
covenants. A physician restrictive covenant is a clause typically
found in employment agreements between physicians and their
employers that restricts the right of a physician to engage in a
business similar to or competitive with that of the employer after
the conclusion or termination of the physician's employmene
Physicians are usually required by their employers to sign such
covenants prior to beginning their practice. The contractual clauses
obligate physicians to refrain from engaging in or establishing a
competitive medical practice within a certain geographic region for a
limited time period. The restrictive covenant typically will also
prohibit a physician from treating patients at hospitals within the
6
same geographic area.
Physician restrictive covenants have steadily gained in use and
importance within the medical community, in part due to the
increased professional mobility of physicians. Physicians today are
more likely to change employers than in the past. Prior to 1990, less
than two percent of physicians changed jobs during their career.
Physicians entering the workforce after 1990, in comparison, had
7
switched employers on average about three times before 2000. In
fact, recent studies indicate that approximately ten percent of
physicians may change jobs annually.8 Many of these physicians are
9
unaware of the impact that restrictive covenants can have on their
4. For an excellent historical perspective on restrictive covenants in
employment contracts, see Harlan M. Blake, Employee Agreements Not to
Compete, 73 HARv. L. REV. 625; 626-28 (1960).
5. See, e.g., 15 GRACE MCLANE GIESEL, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 80.16
(Joseph M. Perillo ed., rev. ed. 2003).
6. See, e.g., Ballesteros v. Johnson, 812 S.W.2d 217, 220 (Mo. Ct. App.
1991) (examining a covenant-not-to-compete that specified seven hospitals
where the departing physician cardiologists could not practice). For a thorough
discussion of physician restrictive covenants, their impact on physicians and
patients, and physician relocation policies, see generally Paula Berg, Judicial
Enforcement of Covenants-not-to-compete Between Physicians: Protecting
Doctors' Interests at Patients' Expense, 45 RUTGERS L. REV. 1 (1992). The
underlying assumption is that "most of a departing physician's patients will
choose to be treated by the employer or by the departing physician's
replacement rather than to follow the physician to an inconvenient location
outside the covenant area." Id. at 4.
7. Howard Markel, Doctors Now Need Well-Honed Skills In Job Hunting,
N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 2001, at F5.
8. Id.; see also Am. Acad. of Family Physicians, More Docs Job Hunting,
FAM. PRAc. MGMT., July/Aug. 2001, at 23.
9. See Arthur S. Di Dio, The Legal Implications of Noncompetition
Agreements in Physician Contracts, 20 J. LEGAL MED. 457,457 (1999) ("[U]nder
current law, the physician-employee faces 'an uphill battle in challenging a
restrictive covenant."); see also Derek W. Loeser, The Legal, Ethical, and
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mobility and professional opportunities. lO Doctors are regularly
forced to stop or relocate their practices due to the enforcement of
physician restrictive covenants. Although a physician who chooses to
leave a practice in spite of a restrictive covenant may suffer
financially because of the loss of a patient base, the physician has an
ongoing responsibility to the patients with whom he is no longer
legally permitted to have a relationship.l1 Thus, for physicians,
these covenants often present difficult economic and ethical
challenges.
Court opinions tend to emphasize the negative impact of these
12
covenants upon the doctors themselves.
However, individual
patients of these doctors can also suffer from the enforcement of
these covenants. A patient's quality of care is often directly affected
by the stability of the patient's relationship with his or her
physician, particularly in fields such as pulmonology and
psychiatry. 13
Physician restrictive covenants can inhibit the
formation of long-term relationships between physicians and
patients and, thus, result in a lesser quality of care for the patient. 14
Practical Implications of Noncompetition Clauses: What Physicians Should
Know Before They Sign, 31 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 283, 284 (2003).
10. Physicians expend significant time and energy developing professional
relationships with hospitals and other physicians.
When faced with a
restrictive covenant, a physician must choose between staying in the
employment relationship or leaving and effectively completely terminating his
practice. See Brian Wyatt, Scrutinize Restrictive Covenants, PHYSICIAN'S NEWS
DIG., June 1997, http://www.physiciansnews.com/law/697wyatt.html; see also
Michael R. Burke, Limiting Restrictive Covenants, FAM. PRAc. MGMT., Apr.
2001, at 50, 50.
11. See Di Dio, supra note 9, at 474-75.
12. See, e.g., Keeley v. Cardiovascular Surgical Assocs., 510 S.E.2d 880,
885 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999) (upholding a noncompetition agreement to protect the
former employer's "legitimate business interests" in maintaining its
"substantial patient base and network of referring physicians throughout the
[protected territory)"); Willman v. Beheler, 499 S.w.2d 770, 777 (Mo. 1973)
(upholding the restrictive covenant because of the importance of respecting "a
counterbalancing public policy . . . in enforcing contractual rights and
obligations"), abrogated by State ex rei. Leonardi v. Sherry, 137 S.W.3d 462 (Mo.
2004) (concerning the request for a jury trial in litigation arising from a
restrictive covenant in a contract between a physician and a pharmaceutical
company conducting a pharmaceutical trial).
13. See Berg, supra note 6, at 31-34.
14. See Debra Pressey, Sore Issue for Some Physicians, CHAMPAIGN-URBANA
NEWS-GAZETTE,
Oct.
5,
2003,
http://www.news-gazette.com/news/
local/2003/10/05/sore_issue3or_some_physicians/. An orthopedic surgeon who
had introduced state legislation to ban restrictive covenants between physicians
in Illinois stated that "he's watched dozens of doctors forced to take their
specialties out of the community just because they wanted to leave one of the
local clinics. And, he contends, it's the patients who ultimately suffer." Id.
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One might assume that physician restrictive covenants would
receive special treatment by the judiciary given the unique problems
they present. Unfortunately, the vast majority of courts currently
view the physician-patient relationship as analogous to a simple
merchant-customer relationship, thus comparing a very complex
relationship to an overly simplified one. IS These courts do not
analyze physician restrictive covenants any differently than they
analyze covenants-not-to-compete between commercial parties. As
is the case with restrictive covenants between commercial parties,
the courts apply a "rule of reason" test to determine whether
physician restrictive covenants are enforceable. 16 Under the rule of
reason test, a restrictive covenant is reasonable, and therefore
enforceable, if it 1) is no broader than necessary to protect a
legitimate interest of the employer, 2) does not unduly burden the
employee, and 3) does not harm the public. I? The rule of reason test
historically offers little hope of success to physicians seeking to
avoid enforcement of restrictive covenants. IS Applying the rule of
15. A few states have independently banned such agreements. See Berg,
supra note 6, at 10-14. Although eight states have invalidated noncompetition
agreements between physicians, only Colorado, Delaware, and Massachusetts
specifically prohibit such agreements by statute. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-2113(3) (2004) (prohibiting restrictive covenants but permitting damage awards
on the termination of a physician employment agreement); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
6, § 2707 (2005); MAss. ANN. LAwS. ch. 112 § 12X (LexisNexis 2004). Though
the Alabama, California, Florida, Louisiana, Montana, and North Dakota
antitrust statutes do not specifically address physician restrictive covenants,
they prohibit the use of noncompetition agreements among professionals
including physicians. Berg, supra note 6, at 12. See generally Michael G. Getty,
Enforceability of Non-Competition Covenants in Physician Employment
Contracts: Confusion in the Courts, 7 J. LEGAL MED. 235 (1986) (discussing the
evolution, effects, and inconsistent judicial enforcement of and proposing an
alternative system to noncompetition agreements in physician employment
contracts).
16. See, e.g., Weber v. Tillman, 913 P.2d 84,96-97 (Kan. 1996) (enforcing a
noncom petition agreement among physicians as a reasonable contractual
agreement); Karlin v. Weinberg, 390 A.2d 1161, 1169-70 (N.J. 1978) (applying a
reasonability test to a noncompetition agreement among dermatologists);
Iredell Digestive Disease Clinic, P.A. v. Petrozza, 92 N.C. App. 21, 26-27, 373
S.E.2d 449, 452 (1988), affd, 324 N.C. 327, 377 S.E. 2d 750 (1989); Holzer
Clinic, Inc. v. Simpson, No. 97CA9, 1998 WL 241887, at *6-7 (Ohio Ct. App.
Apr. 28, 1998) (applying a reasonability test to a noncom petition agreement
between a physician and former employer).
17. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 188 (1981).
18. See, e.g., Prairie Eye Ctr. v. Butler, 768 N.E.2d 414, 419-21 (Ill. App. Ct.
2002); Wash. County Mem'l Hosp. v. Sidebottom, 7 S.W.3d 542, 545-46 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1999); Hauser v. Harding, 126 N.C. 175, 177-78,35 S.E. 586, 587-88 (1900)
(upholding a physician restrictive covenant without acknowledging the parties'
occupations as physicians as relevant to validity of noncompete agreement).
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reason test, courts have only rarely invalidated physician restrictive
covenants solely out of concern for the public welfare. 19 This
approach does not respect the unique role a physician can play in
the community. Some factors courts havedownplayed or ignored are
the physician's ability to provide optimal care and the patients'
ability to choose their physician freely.
Surprisingly, nearly
identical considerations 20 have been applied by most courts to limit,
or completely bar, the enforceability of attorney restrictive
covenants. 21 This strangely disparate treatment of two professional
groups exists despite the fact that the physician-patient relationship
is at least as important from a public policy standpoint as that of
attorney and client. 22 The rule of reason test, as currently applied
19. Several courts have summarily dismissed the argument that
noncompetition agreements between physicians are against public policy. See,
e.g., Phoenix Orthopedic Surgeons, Ltd., v. Peairs, 790 P.2d 752, 758 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1989); Raymundo v. Hammond Clinic Ass'n., 449 N.E.2d 276,280-81 (Ind.
1983).
20. See, e.g., Dowd & Dowd, Ltd. v. Gleason, 693 N.E.2d 358, 369 (Ill. 1998)
(finding that the bar on noncom petition agreements among lawyers "is designed
both to afford clients greater freedom in choosing counsel and to protect lawyers
from onerous conditions that would unduly limit their mobility"); see also Jacob
v. Norris, McLaughlin & Marcus, 607 A.2d 142, 146 (N.J. 1992) (stating that the
ethical bar is "designed to serve the public interest in maximum access to
lawyers"); Cohen v. Lord, Day & Lord, 550 N.E.2d 410,413 (N.Y. 1989) ("While
a law firm has a legitimate interest in its own survival and economic well-being
and in maintaining its clients, it cannot protect those interests by ... restricting
the choices of the clients to retain and continue the withdrawing member as
counsel. ").
21. Although most courts do not explicitly describe their analysis as the
application of a per se rule, that characterization has been used by a number of
commentators. See, e.g., Stephen E. Kalish, Covenants-not-to-compete and the
Legal Profession, 29 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 423, 425 (1985). A well-considered law
review article that discusses the impact of this approach upon the law firm
structure is Larry E. Ribstein, Ethical Rules, Agency Costs, and Law Firm
Structure, 84 VA. L. REV. 1707, 1730-38 (1998). Other law review commentaries
on lawyer noncompetition agreements are cited in Joseph M. Perillo, The Law of
Lawyers' Contracts Is Different, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 443, 477 n.235 (1998).
22. The reasoning behind the ABA's decision to deem restrictive covenants
unethical in 1960 illuminates the enhanced status that relationships between
professionals and their clients or, in this case, patients, requires.
A general covenant restricting an employed lawyer, after leaving the
employment, from practicing in the community for a stated period,
appears to the Committee to be an unwarranted restriction on the
right of a lawyer to choose where he will practice and inconsistent
with our professional status. Accordingly, the Committee is of the
opinion it would be improper for the employing lawyer to require the
covenant and likewise for the employed lawyer to agree to it.
ABA Comm. on Profl Ethics, Formal Op. 300 (1961); see also 2 GEOFFREY C.
HAzARD, JR. & W. WILLIAM HODES, THE LAw OF LAWYERING § 47.4 (3d ed. 2001 &
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by the courts, overemphasizes freedom of contract principles and
economic harm to physician employers. The courts have failed to
recognize that physician restrictive covenants are partly at odds
with professional medical ethics and good medical care.
This Article advances an argument that courts must modify the
traditional rule of reason test in future evaluation of physician
restrictive covenants.
Courts must consider the impact that
enforcement of restrictive covenants will have on the relationships
between physicians and their patients within the public-interest
prong of the rule of reason analysis. As part of this public-interest
calculus, courts must weigh the potential harm to patient choice and
to the professional and ethical obligations of physicians to their
patients. These considerations should supplement the traditional
test's vague public-interest prong with the more discrete concerns of
the patients of a particular physician. 23
Contemporary courts' application of the rule of reason to
physician restrictive covenants 24 is summarized in Part II of this
Article.
Typically, a court will only refuse to enforce a
noncom petition agreement when doing so would create a scarcity of
physicians, thereby causing unjustifiable damage to the public
welfare. 25 But defining the public interest so narrowly ignores the
harm to existing patients who, in most instances, suffer when they
lose the continuity, trust, and understanding offered by their
original physician. 26 The shortcomings of defining the public
Supp. 2005). The ABA Committee on Professional Ethics originally opposed
lawyers' covenants-not-to-compete because they smacked of commercialism.
ABA Comm. on Profl Ethics, Formal Op. 300 (1961); see also Charles E. Cantu
& Jared Woodfill, V, Upon Leaving a Firm: Tell the Truth or Hide the Ball, 39
VILL. L. REV. 773, 784 (1994) (noting that in its decision, the ABA Committee
emphasized that law is a profession rather than a business, and that clients
must be seen as more than merchandise).
23. The few courts that have recognized the depth of this prong essentially
allow it to devour the other prongs of the rule of reason, holding that a violation
of public policy makes all other prongs moot. See Valley Med. Specialists v.
Farber, 982 P.2d 1277, 1285-86 (Ariz. 1999) (concluding that restrictive
covenants between physicians must be "strictly construed" because of the
weighty public policy considerations). Interestingly, since the public policy
analysis was almost exclusively general, the court found it necessary to remind
the reader that it was not voiding all restrictive covenants between doctors per
se. However, the court only vaguely indicated that any covenants may be legal
in the future. [d.
24. See infra notes 31-47 and accompanying text.
25. See, e.g., Iredell Digestive Disease Clinic, P.A. v. Petrozza, 92 N.C. App.
21, 28, 373 S.E.2d 449, 453-54 (Ct. App. 1988) (refusing to enforce a restrictive
covenant because doing so would create a shortage of gastroenterologists in the
area), affd, 324 N.C. 327, 377 S.E.2d 750 (1989).
26. See infra notes 79-97 and accompanying text.
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interest in broad, yet vague, notions-such as "scarcity"-rather
than recognizing its complex nature, are also addressed in Part II of
27
this Article.
Part III discusses some solutions to the indiscriminate
application of the rule of reason to physician restrictive covenants. 28
In Part IV, the author proposes that in future cases, incumbent
patients should be treated as third-party beneficiaries of restrictive
covenants, giving them an explicit interest in the balancing of harms
29
under the rule of reason test. By the end of Part IV, it should be
clear that once courts address the interests of incumbent patients
when evaluating physician restrictive covenants, what results is a
new reasonability analysis that better balances the interests
30
affected by enforcement of such covenants. This new rule of reason
will permit enforcement of a competition restraint if it 1) is limited
to prevent only unfair competition, 2) does not improperly elevate an
employer's economic interests above the departing physician's
interests, and 3) does not substantially harm the physician's
incumbent or potential patient base.
II.

THE APPLICATION OF RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS TO
MEDICAL PROFESSIONALS

A.

The Rule of Reason Generally
Physician employers commonly include noncom petition
provisions in physician employment contracts. 31 These provisions
apply in the event a physician leaves his or her employer and act to
limit a physician's ability to practice medicine within specified
geographic areas. They further contain nonsolicitation clauses,
which bar the physician from advising patients to follow the
physician to his or her new place of employment. Even though these
provisions are contrary to the ideals of free competition and the
ability of an individual to choose his or her profession, courts uphold
these noncompete agreements in most instances, applying the rule
32
of reason standard.
Under the rule of reason, a noncompete
agreement is enforceable as long as it is reasonable as to time and
geographic restrictions and its enforcement is not against public
policy. The rule of reason protects the employee's interests, while
33
also protecting the employer's legitimate business interests.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

See infra notes 61-83 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 145-204 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 205-27 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 236-48 and accompanying text.
See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
15 GIESEL, supra note 5, § 80.6.
See id.
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When applying the rule of reason, courts consider whether (1)
the employer has a legitimate protectable interest,34 (2) the
restrictive covenant is reasonably designed to protect that interest,
(3) enforcement will unduly burden the employee,35 and (4) the
enforcement will violate public policy.36 The judiciary usually views
restrictive employment covenants skeptically,37 reasoning that a
postemployment restraint is difficult to justifY because it may
impede an employee's ability to earn a livelihood and deprive the
public of an employee's skills and services but not significantly
3s
Each jurisdiction's
advance an employer's economic interests.
analysis of restrictive covenants is unique. Generally, however,
courts will first determine whether consideration for the covenant

34. Enforcement of physician restrictive covenants has been "justified on
the ground that the employer has a legitimate interest in restraining the
employee from appropriating valuable trade information and customer
relationships to which he has had access in the course of his employment."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 188 cmt. b (1981). Although the mere
threat of competition is not a sufficient interest to justifY enforcement of a
restraint on competition, see, e.g., Duffner v. Alberty, 718 S.W.2d 111, 112 (Ark.
Ct. App. 1986) ("[T]he law will not enforce a contract merely to prohibit
ordinary competition."), courts have recognized that employers have protectable
interests in retaining patients, see, e.g., Duneland Emergency Physician's Med.
Group v. Brunk, 723 N.E.2d 963, 966-67 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (finding no
legitimate protectable interest in retaining patients since restricted physician
worked in an emergency room setting); confidential information, see, e.g.,
Dental E., P.C. v. Westercamp, 423 N.W.2d 553, 555 (Iowa Ct. App. 1988)
(enforcing covenant-not-to-compete because departing dentist had access to
employer's methods of operation and business techniques as well as to its
patients' names); training, see, e.g., Oudenhoven v. Nishioka, 190 N.W.2d 920,
921 (Wis. 1971) (characterizing a typical noncompete between physicians as a
sacrifice often made by a younger physician in order to receive valuable
training); and goodwill, see, e.g., Raymundo v. Hammond Clinic Ass'n, 449
N.E.2d 276, 279 (Ind. 1983) (holding that the covenant "did nothing more than
protect the Clinic's goodwill against piracy by a mutinous partner").
35. To show a restrictive covenant is unduly burdensome, a physician must
show the agreement imposes some severe and unique personal hardship. See
Blake, supra note 4, at 684-86; see also Lewis v. Surgery & Gynecology, Inc., No.
90AP-300, 1991 WL 35010, at *4 (Ohio Ct. App. March 12, 1991) (holding that
enforcement of a restrictive covenant would impose an undue burden by forcing
a physician to relocate and remove her developmentally disabled daughter from
a special school).
36. For a brief overview of the public interests involved, see Michael R.
Sullivan, Note, Covenants Not to Compete and Liquidated Damages Clauses:
Diagnosis and Treatment for Physicians, 46 S.C. L. Rev. 505, 514 (1995) (citing
Andrea Cooper, Law and Medicine: Restrictive Covenants, 248 J. AM. MED.
AsS'N 3091 (1982».
37. See Blake, supra note 4, at 647.
38. See id.

HeinOnline -- 41 Wake Forest L. Rev. 196 2006

2006]

PHYSICIAN RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS

197

exists. 39 If the employee received adequate consideration for signing
the covenant, judges will proceed to examine separately the
interests of the employer, the employee, and the public in order to
determine whether the restrictive covenant is reasonable under the
circumstances. 4o Generally, a restrictive covenant is unreasonable if
1) it is broader than necessary to protect the employer's legitimate
interests,41 or 2) the employer's interests are outweighed by the
42
interests of either the employee or the public. Courts have applied
this "rule of reason" test to noncom petition agreements signed by
accountants,43 doctors,44 veterinarians,45 as well as other
39. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 71 (1981).
40. See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 5.3, at 356 (2d ed. 1990).
41. If an employer does have a protectable interest, the court will proceed
to consider whether the restrictive covenant is reasonable as to its duration,
geographical area, and type of medical practice restricted. See Valley Med.
Specialists v. Farber, 982 P.2d 1277, 1284 (Ariz. 1999) ("The idea is to give the
employer a reasonable amount of time to overcome the former employee's loss,
usually by hiring a replacement and giving that replacement time to establish a
working relationship."); see also Berg, supra note 6, at 23-27; Blake, supra note
4, at 676-81; Mark A. Glick et aI., The Law and Economics of Post-Employment
Covenants: A Unified Framework, 11 GEO MAsON L. REV. 357, 371-72 (2002)
(providing a general overview of technicalities of the modern rule of reason
test). The average mileage restriction for restrictive covenants that are
enforced is 33.9 miles.
Empirical Study, A Statistical Analysis of
Noncompetition Clauses in Employment Contracts, 15. J. CORP. L. 483, 511
(1990); see, e.g., Northside Hosp., Inc. v. McCord, 537 S.E.2d 697, 699 (Ga. Ct.
App. 2000); see also Zulima V. Farber et aI., Are Physician Post-Employment
Noncompete Agreements Enforceable?, METRO. CORP. COUNSEL, March 2004, at 4
(discussing the varying enforceable distances in various states' physician
restrictive covenants).
42. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 188(b) (1981); see, e.g., Mantek
Div. of NCH Corp. v. Share Corp., 780 F.2d 702, 711 (7th Cir. 1986) (holding
that a provision prohibiting salesmen from selling a competing product in their
former territories is unnecessary to protect an employer's interest because only
a prohibition on calling customers with whom the employee came into contact
during employment is reasonable); Ferrofluidics Corp. v. Advanced Vacuum
Components, Inc., 789 F. Supp. 1201, 1210 (D.N.H. 1992) (holding that a
covenant-not-to-compete that prohibited employees from working for competing
magnetic fluid manufacturer for five years is an undue burden on employees),
affd, 968 F.2d 1463 (1st Cir. 1992).
43. See, e.g., Fuller v. Brough, 411 P.2d 18, 22 (Colo. 1966) (upholding as
reasonable a restrictive covenant prohibiting a withdrawing accountant from
practicing within forty-five miles of city for five years); Peat, Marwick, Mitchell
& Co. v. Sharp, 585 S.W.2d 905, 908 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979) (declaring that a
restrictive covenant agreed to by an accountant was unreasonable because the
clause failed to designate a specific geographic area).
44. See, e.g., Odess v. Taylor, 211 So. 2d 805, 810 (Ala. 1968) (holding
unreasonable and unenforceable a restrictive covenant prohibiting a specialist
from practicing in area where shortage of specialists existed); Gelder Med.
Group v. Webber, 363 N.E.2d 573, 577 (N.Y. 1977) (upholding a reasonable

HeinOnline -- 41 Wake Forest L. Rev. 197 2006

198

WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41

46
professionals.
The rule of reason test is the "dominant judicial
approach to enforceability.,,47

B. Current Application of the Rule of Reason to Physician
Restrictive Covenants: A One-Dimensional View of the DoctorPatient Relationship
1. Economics Over Patients: Prioritizing the Employer's
Interests
Physician employers argue that they are entitled to the
enforcement of covenants-not-to-compete based upon protectable
interests in their customer base, confidential information, training,
and customer goodwill. 48 Of these, physician employers most often
assert a protectable interest in keeping existing patients after an
employee's departure. 49 The physician employer fears that patients
who have been treated continually by a specific physician will wish
to maintain the relationship with that physician even after the
physician resigns from practice with the physician employer. 50
covenant restricting a physician's right to practice within thirty miles of former
partnership based on lack of injury to the public).
45. See, e.g., Cukjati v. Burkett, 772 S.W.2d 215, 218 (Tex. App. 1989)
(invalidating as unreasonable a covenant-not-to-compete in veterinarian's
employment contract which prohibited him from practicing veterinary medicine
within twelve miles of his employer's clinic); Hopper v. All Pet Animal Clinic,
Inc., 861 P.2d 531, 544-45 (Wyo. 1993) (upholding covenant restricting
competition by declaring that restricting veterinarian from practicing on small
animals within five-mile radius of city limits was reasonable, but that a threeyear limit was unreasonable).
46. See, e.g., Ridley v. Krout, 180 P.2d 124, 132-33 (Wyo. 1947) (declaring
unreasonable and unenforceable an agreement restricting mechanic from
working for seven years in specific cities and counties); Keller v. Cal. Liquid Gas
Corp., 363 F. Supp. 123, 125-28 (D. Wyo. 1973) (analyzing a noncompete
agreement between a buyer and seller of a liquid gas business). See generally
14 SAMUEL WILLISTON & WALTER H.E. JAEGER, A TREATISE ON THE LAw OF
CONTRACTS § 1636 (3d ed. 1972).
47. Rachel S. Arnow-Richman, Bargaining for Loyalty in the Information
Age: A Reconsideration of the Role of Substantive Fairness in Enforcing
Employee Noncompetes, 80 OR. L. REV. 1163, 1172 (2001).
48. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONTRACTS § 188 cmt. b (1981); see, e.g.,
Folsom Funeral Servo v. Rodgers, 372 N.E.2d 532, 533 (Mass. App. Ct. 1978)
(declaring a restrictive covenant unreasonable because customer relationships
and contacts did not have a great impact on the undertaking business);
Purchasing Assocs., Inc. V. Weitz, 196 N.E. 2d 245, 248 (N.Y. 1963) (reversing
the lower court's judgment in favor of a restrictive covenant after discovering no
loss of trade secrets, customers, and unique and extraordinary services).
49. See Prairie Eye Ctr., Ltd. v. Butler, 768 N.E.2d 414,421 (Ill. App. Ct.
2002) ("[Mledical practices have a 'protectible interest in the patients of their
physicians and this interest is inferred from the nature of the profession.").
50. See id. at 422.
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Courts generally accept this reasoning by treating patients as
assets of the physician employer that could be unfairly appropriated
by the physician, thus warranting protection by a covenant-not-tocompete. 51 Such an approach subordinates the personal relationship
of the doctor-patient to the economic relationship between a patientcustomer and a clinic, office, or practice group. Consider, as an
example, the Minnesota Supreme Court's decision in Granger v.
Craven. 52
In that case, followed by a majority of courts,53 the Minnesota
Supreme Court upheld a physician restrictive covenant because,
according to the court's reasoning, it did no more than necessary to
protect a practice group against a departing physician's ''hold" on his
patients. 54 The Granger court set the tone for later courts that
continued to view patients merely as customers, rather than
individuals whose unique relationships with their physicians would
normally distinguish them from otherwise indiscriminate
commercial clients. 55
Courts have even gone as far as to enforce physician restrictive
covenants despite recognition that such covenants would be enforced
to the detriment of the physician's patients. 56 In Dickinson Medical
51. See Blake, supra note 4, at 662 ("Restraints upon professional
employees, such as associates or technical assistants of lawyers, doctors,
architects, accountants, and dentists, are also generally upheld when the
customer relationships are substantial."). But see Mandeville v. Harman, 7 A.
37,40-41 (N.J. Ch. 1886) (holding that protection of a medical practice's patient
base was not a sufficient interest to warrant judicial enforcement of a covenantnot-to-compete).
52. 199 N.W. 10 (Minn. 1924).
53. See Berg, supra note 6, at 17.
54. See Granger, 199 N.W. at 13-14.
55. See, e.g., Keeley v. Cardiovascular Surgical Assocs., P.C., 510 S.E.2d
880, 884 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999) (upholding a noncompetition agreement among
cardiovascular surgeons that barred the employee from any competing
cardiovascular surgery practice within seventy-five miles of the former
employer for a two-year period after termination to protect the former
employer's "legitimate business interests" in maintaining its "substantial
patient base and network of referring physicians throughout the protected
territory").
56. See Prairie Eye Ctr., Ltd. v. Butler, 768 N.E.2d 414, 421 (Ill. App. Ct.
2002) ("Despite our sympathy for the rights of patients to choose their own
doctors, we are constrained to follow the long line of precedent finding
noncom petition agreements enforceable in the medical profession." (internal
citations omitted»; Bloomington Urological Assocs., S.C. v. Scaglia, 686 N.E.2d
389, 394 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997) (declaring a noncompete agreement between
physicians enforceable but acknowledging the sacrosanct relationship between
the contracting physician and his patients); see also Willman v. Beheler, 499
S.W.2d 770, 777 (Mo. 1973) (holding a covenant-not-to-compete valid even
though a shortage of surgeons existed in the area because such shortages
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Group v. Foote,57 a hospital's only board-certified staff oncologist
resigned and left with a computer print-out of the names and
addresses of all the cancer patients she had treated with
chemotherapy. 58 Although Dr. Foote's employment contract barred
her from treating former patients, Dr. Foote argued that she had a
professional and ethical responsibility to contact her former patients
to offer continuity of treatment. 59 Though the Delaware court
sympathized with the plight of her patients, it determined the
patient list was a protectable trade secret wrongfully appropriated
60
by Dr. Foote and consequently enforced the restrictive covenant.
2. Public Interest as a Numbers Game: "Patients are not . ..
property or chattel. ,,61
The public interest, or public policy, element of the rule of
reason test has been a magic wand of sorts for courts to use as they
please in upholding or striking down restrictive covenants between
physicians.
Unfortunately, the vast majority of contemporary
evaluations of the public interest prong focus almost exclusively on
the interest of the public at large,62 rather than also considering the
63
interests of individual patients.
Courts upholding covenants
between doctors either ignore this prong altogether64 or interpret it
existed in many areas).
57. No. 834-K, 1984 WL 8208, at *1 (Del. Ch. May 10, 1984).
58. See id.
59. [d. at *2. For further discussion of some of the ethical issues raised by
physician restrictive covenants, see Derek W. Loeser, supra note 9, at 286-87.
60. Chancellor Brown noted:
[The issue of the case] lacks the ring of humanitarianism that
once was associated with the practice of medicine. Prior to this
application, I never had reason to equate a list of persons
suffering from cancer and other illnesses with a proprietary
'customer list' as that term is normally employed in the world
of commerce. But I guess business is business, regardless of
the form it takes.
Dickinson, 1984 WL 8208 at *2.
61. Humana Med. Plan, Inc. v. Jacobson, 614 So. 2d 520, 522 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App.1992).
62. See Weber v. Tillman, 913 P.2d 84, 93-95 (Kan. 1996) (discussing the
public interest in the ability to access physician care). Courts often simply
calculate the numbers of certain specialists needed in the pertinent
geographical area without any inquiry into the quality of the care or the
interests of individual patients.
63. See, e.g., Rash v. Toccoa Clinic Med. Assoc., 320 S.E.2d 170, 173 (Ga.
1984) (viewing the harm to the public of upholding the restrictive covenant as
mitigated by treating one community's loss of a doctor as another community's
gain); Willman v. Beheler, 499 S.W.2d 770, 777 (Mo. 1973) (noting that most
communities are short of medical doctors).
64. See Rash, 320 S.E.2d at 173-74 (dismissing the public policy prong as
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to require only a certain number of physicians or specialists in a
certain geographic area. 65 Those courts that strike down covenants
between physicians often use the public interest prong to
overshadow and render moot the other elements of the rule of
reason test. 66 These small minority of latter courts have, to a
varying degree, identified and explored the "public interest" in
relation to the doctor-patient relationship, often viewing the issue as
much more complex than simply a game of dueling statistics. 67
In many of the most recent cases over disputed physician
restrictive covenants, the courts have not found the potential harm
to the public to be substantial enough to rescind the covenants. 68
The lack of attention given by the Kansas Supreme Court in Weber
v. Tillman 69 to the impact enforcement would have on the public
essentially irrelevant since a doctor in one city is as useful as a doctor in
another).
65. See Rash, 320 S.E.2d at 173-74; Marshall v. Covington, 339 P.2d 504,
506-07 (Idaho 1959) (citing Bauer v. Sawyer, infra, for the same proposition);
Bauer v. Sawyer, 126 N.E.2d 844, 851 (Ill. App. Ct. 1955) (finding no evidence
that enforcement would create a shortage of doctors in the restriction area and,
thus, finding no public harm); Cogley Clinic v. Martini, 112 N.W.2d 678, 682
(Iowa 1962) (finding that a sufficient number of doctors remained available to
the community to avoid public harm from enforcement). But see Duffner v.
Alberty, 718 S.W.2d 111, 113-14 (Ark. Ct. App. 1986) (striking down a
restrictive covenant on a finding that the agreement "constitutes an undue
interference with the interests of the public right of availability of the
orthopedic surgeon it prefers to use and that the covenant's enforcement would
result in an unreasonable restraint of trade"). Even if enforcement would
create a shortage of doctors within the restriction area, the resulting harm still
may not always be deemed sufficient to justify denying enforcement. See, e.g.,
Weber, 913 P.2d at 96 (enforcing a restriction). The Weber court noted that each
of the cases it cited for having held a restriction unenforceable because of the
potential shortage of physicians dealt with "a shortage of physicians [in]
specialties which were, for lack of a better term, medically necessary." Id. at 95
(internal citations omitted).
66. See infra notes 127-44 and accompanying text.
67. See id.
68. See, e.g., Willman, 499 S.W.2d at 777 (enforcing a restrictive covenant
despite evidence of shortage of surgeons in the northwest part of the state);
Gant v. Hygeia Facilities Found., Inc., 384 S.E.2d 842, 846 n.7 (W. Va. 1989)
(enforcing a restrictive covenant that required a covenantor to leave a rural
area despite evidence of a statewide shortage of rural doctors).
69. 913 P.2d 84 (Kan. 1996). The restrictive covenant barred the doctor's
practice of dermatology within a thirty-mile radius of his former practice for a
period of two years. If he chose to violate the covenant, he was required to pay
six-months salary plus bonuses to Dr. Weber. Id. at 87. Forty to fifty percent of
the departing doctor's patients had been patients of the former practice. The
competition restriction, however, barred all practice in the designated
geographic area and was not limited to only the treatment of former patients of
the employer. See id. at 92.
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welfare is typical. Dr. Weber, the only dermatologist in northwest
and north central Kansas, hired Dr. Tillman on the condition that
he would not practice dermatology within thirty miles of Dr. Weber's
70
office for a period of two years following termination.
The court
upheld the noncompetition clause,71 finding the covenant was not
against public policy72 despite expert testimony that the
community's dermatological needs would be jeopardized if Dr.
73
Tillman was banned from practicing in the restricted area.
The court seemed relatively unconcerned by this danger,74
especially because of the possibility Dr. Tillman might "buyout" the
restriction. "[A]s a practical matter, the people [of the area] ... may
not lose Dr. Tillman's services as a dermatologist," the court
observed. 75 "[T]heir welfare is not injured if they have to travel
further to obtain dermatology services should Dr. Tillman elect not
76
[to buyout the restriction]," the court stated. Because the lack of
any "substantial public injury" to potential patients compared
unfavorably to Dr. Weber's "investment of years, education, and
effort in establishing his practice and the value of goodwill
developed over 17 years,,,77 the court held the covenant's scope
protected Dr. Weber from any competitive advantage Dr. Tillman
might derive from his former employer's goodwill. 78
70. ld. at 87. To stay in practice, Dr. Tillman was required to pay
liquidated damages totaling more than $82,000. ld. at 88.
71. The Weber court noted that it had previously found a ten-year
noncompetition clause between two physicians to be reasonable in time
although it reduced the geographic scope from one-hundred miles to five miles.
See id. at 90 (discussing Foltz v. Struxness, 215 P.2d 133, 133 (Kan. 1950».
72. See id. at 96. But see also, e.g., Duffner v. Alberty, 718 S.W.2d 111, 11314 (Ark. Ct. App. 1986) (holding a noncompetition agreement invalid as an
unreasonable restraint of trade). The Duffner court invalidated the covenant
because it prohibited only ordinary competition and declared that the
physicians had no valid economic interest to protect because:
[There were nol trade secrets, formulas, methods, or devices
which gave appellant an advantage. . .. At the time he joined
the association he had received his training and skills elsewhere
and brought them with him. There is nothing. . . to indicate
that he learned any trade secret or surgical procedures ... which
were not readily available to other[sl.
ld. at 114.
73. See Weber, 913 P.2d at 93. Dr. Weber himself admitted that the
community could support two or more dermatologists. ld. For a further
discussion of liquidated damages clauses, see infra notes 168-72 and
accompanying text.
74. See Weber, 913 P.2d at 93-95.
75. ld. at 96.
76. ld.
77. ld. at 92, 96.
78. ld. at 95. Note the difficulty Dr. Weber had in locating a physician to
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Even when courts recognize how a scarcity of physicians will
affect the public interest, they sometimes attempt to mitigate its
significance by suggesting that though one community may lose a
physician, another must necessarily gain one.
This analysis,
however, not only ignores the intimate nature of the doctor-patient
relationship, but improperly shifts the focus from the affected
community to an unrelated community.79 For example, in Gillespie
u. Carbondale & Marion Eye Centers, Ltd.,sO an Illinois appellate
court enforced a restrictive covenant against a physician even
though statistics presented during trial indicated that doing so could
have caused a shortage of eye specialists in the community and
could have left hospitals "unable to provide adequate medical care at
a reasonable cost."Sl The court reasoned that because the doctor was
prohibited from practicing in one area, any public harm would be
mitigated by his provision of those same medical services in another
community.s2 The interests of the patients in the restricted area
were completely ignored. s3 Indeed, the notion that the benefit of
come to the area initially. Evidence showed that the departing physicianemployee "had no connection to the community prior to his employment, and he
brought with him no patients . . .. [Hel acknowledged that he benefited by
beginning his career in an established practice rather than starting his own."
Id. at 92; see also Canfield v. Spear, 254 N.E.2d 433, 434 (Ill. 1969) (placing
importance upon the fact that a departing doctor had been "a newcomer to the
community, and it was doubtless through the opportunities provided by this
association [with the employerl that he became known in the city"). But see
Damsey v. Mankowitz, 339 So. 2d 282, 283 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976) (finding a
noncompetition agreement unreasonable when there was a shortage of
physicians in the area).
79. See, e.g., Willman v. Beheler, 499 S.W.2d 770,777 (Mo. 1973) (rejecting
the public harm argument and explaining that, while enforcement of the
restrictive covenant would lead to a shortage of health care providers in the
restricted area, it would result in an increase in health care providers in the
area in which the departing physician established a new practice). The
Willman court also upheld the provision because of "a counterbalancing public
policy ... in enforcing contractual rights and obligations." Id. Thus, any harm
to the public within the covenant area would be offset by a benefit to those who
reside within the departing physician's new service area. Id.
80. 622 N.E.2d 1267 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993).
81. Id. at 1269.
82. Id. at 1270.
83. Likewise, the Georgia court in Rash v. Toccoa Clinic Medical
Associates, 320 S.E.2d 170 (Ga. 1984), considered the interests of potential
medical patients only briefly and reached a similar conclusion. Recognizing
that the enforcement of this restriction might "limit the right of potential
patients" in a certain area "to avail themselves" of the doctor's services, the
court found the point to be unpersuasive. Id. at 173.
[Ilt can be argued with at least equal conviction that this would afford
countless other people in other areas, both in and outside of the state,
the opportunity to have a physician in their areas. There is no reason
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adding a new doctor to a to-be-announced location equals the cost to
incumbent patients caused by losing their doctor is ridiculous. The
incumbent patients suffer in the short term a great deal more than
the potential new patients gain. Also, the analysis depends on how
many specialists are in a market. If the city of Washington, D.C.
has two thousand dermatologists, losing one does not impede patient
choice.
If Lexington, Virginia, however, has only two
dermatologists, losing one of the two dermatologists to a noncompete
clause is a big deal.

C. Issues Ignored in the Current Analysis of Physician Restrictive
Covenants
1. Continuity of Care
The current application of the rule of reason to physician
restrictive covenants is contrary to many well-respected medical
studies showing that continuity of care in the doctor-patient
relationship fosters greater quality of health care. 54 It is also
contrary to research that indicates that the involuntary termination
of this relationship may have long-term negative effects on
patients. 85
A patient's ability to build a lasting relationship with the
physician of his or her choice is an important aspect of healthcare.
Continuity of care is a term of art used within the medical
community to mean health care that is given by a single physician
over some period of time and that includes an evolving relationship
between the physician and patient. 86 Research indicates that the
benefits of continuity of care stem from a patient's repeated visits to
the same physician, as opposed to a patient's repeated visits to the
same clinic or office. 87 One study shows that it takes a few to several
to conclude... that the need for the appellant's services, in the
context of this case, is sufficient to outweigh the law's interest in
upholding and protecting freedom to contract and to enforce
contractual rights and obligations.
Id. at 173-74; see also Canfield, 254 N.E.2d at 435 (holding that a doctor "can be
as useful to the public at some other place in the State" as he can be in the place
where the non-competitor agreement is effective because "the health of persons
elsewhere is just as important").
84. Margaret M. Love et aI., Continuity of Care and the Physician·Patient
Relationship, 49 J. FAM. PRAC. 998, 1002 (2000).
85. Tim Stokes et aI., Ending the Doctor-Patient Relationship in General
Practice: A Proposed Model, 21 FAM. PRAC. 507, 513 (2004).
86. See Am. Acad. of Family Physicians, Continuity of Care, Definition of,
http://www.aafp.org/x6694.xml (last visited Feb. 10, 2006).
87. See Arch G. Mainous III & James M. Gill, The Importance of Continuity
of Care in the Likelihood of Future Hospitalization: Is Site of Care Equivalent to
a Primary Clinician?, 88 AM. J. PuB. HEALTH 1539, 1539-40 (1998) (finding
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visits for a patient to even feel comfortable with a new physician,
while it may take several years before a patient feels the physician
knows him or her well. 88 Continuity of care has been linked to
improved patient satisfaction,89 and patients who are more satisfied
with their physician are more compliant with suggested treatment
regimens. 90 For instance, patients with Type 2 Diabetes who have
greater continuity of care with a primary care provider experience
better glucose control, a product of the patient following the
physician's recommended diet changes. 91 Continuity of care has
been further linked to increased utilization of preventative services,

within the Delaware Medicaid Program that greater continuity of care with a
physician decreases the likelihood of subsequent hospital visits and further
noting that it is the physician-patient relationship that is relevant, not
necessarily the relationship a patient has with a specific clinic).
88. See Keith Sinusas, Patients' Attitudes Toward the Closing of a Medical
Practice, 28 J. FAM. PRAc. 561, 561-63 (1989) (reporting the results of a survey
of two hundred patients after their family physician closed his practice and
finding that in a majority of cases it took the physician longer to understand
emotional problems than physical ones). The study revealed that one half of
patients needed a few visits to become comfortable with a new physician, one
third needed several visits to be comfortable, and a small number of people
needed a few years to become comfortable. Id. at 561-62. Most of the
respondents said that it took two to five years for a physician to know their
medical problems well and over five years to believe that their emotional
problems were very well known to the physician. Id. at 563.
89. See Love et aI., supra note 84, at 998, 1002 (analyzing adult Kentucky
Medicaid recipients and finding that continuity of care was an important
predictor of provider communication and patient influence). The study also
found that for patients with asthma, a chronic illness, continuity of care was the
only variable that predicted patient perceptions of physician-patient
communication. This seems to show that there is a special relationship that
exists between patients with chronic illnesses and their physicians and that
continuity of care may be even more important to them than to people who have
acute illnesses. Id. at 1002-03.
90. See Marjorie A. Bowman, Good Physician-Patient Relationship ::
Improved Patient Outcome?, 32 J. FAM. !>RAc. 135, 136 (1991) (citing Francis J.
Martin & Martin J. Bass, The Impact of Discussion of Non-Medical Problems in
the Physician's Office, 6 FAM. PRAC. 254, 255-56 (1989) (discussing a study in
which patients who believed that the "[d]octor tells me all I want to know about
my illness" and the "[d]octor gives me a chance to say what is really on my
mind" had higher rates of compliance with physician's ordered treatments)).
91. See Abstracts, 287 J. AM. MED. AsS'N 2475 (2002) (reporting a study by
Michael L. Parchman et aI., Continuity of Care, Self-management Behaviors,
and Glucose Control in Patients with Type 2 Diabetes, that analyzed a random
sample of adults who had been diagnosed with Type 2 Diabetes and found that
patients who advanced one or more stages in their change of diet regimen had
higher levels of continuity with their physicians than did patients who had not
advanced).
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such as breast and cervical cancer screening in adult women92 and
93
vaccination in children.
Hospitalizations are less likely for
patients who experience. continuity of care. 94 Studies in both the
pediatric and adult populations have shown that greater continuity
of care tends to decrease emergency-department use. 95 Continuity of
care also has been linked to lower health care costs in older
Americans. 96 Long-term continuity of care is difficult to achieve,
however, when a patient must see a different physician frequently
and cannot build a trusting relationship with a physician. 97
92. See Ann S. O'Malley et aI., Continuity of Care and the Use of Breast and
Cervical Cancer Screening Services in a Multiethnic Community, 157 ARCHIVES
INTERNAL MED. 1462, 1462, 1467 (1997) (reporting the existence of a "linear
trend" in the increase of nonmammogram breast and cervical cancer screening
rates, that rates of cancer screenings were higher in women with a usual source
of care than women who did not, and that rates of screenings were even higher
in women who had a regular clinician at the usual source of care).
93. See Dimitri A. Christakis et aI., The Association Between Greater
Continuity of Care and Timely Measles-Mumps-Rubella Vaccination, 90 AM. J.
PuB. HEALTH 962, 963-64 (2000) (finding that patients who were enrolled in
Group Health Cooperative from birth to fifteen months with high and medium
continuity with their physicians were more likely to be immunized by fifteen
months than those who had low continuity with the physician).
94. See Mainous & Gill, supra note 87, at 1539-40 (finding that Delaware
Medicaid patients with greater continuity of care with a physician decreases the
likelihood of subsequent hospital visits).
95. See Dimitri A. Christakis et aI., Is Greater Continuity of Care
Associated With Less Emergency Department Utilization?, 103 PEDIATRICS 738,
739-41 (1999) (finding that children with high levels of continuity of care
experienced less emergency-department visits than children with low levels).
The study also found that attending doctor continuity mattered more than
resident doctor continuity in predicting emergency-department visits among
children. Christakis posited that this may be because attending physicians
interact with the patients over a longer span of time and have a greater
knowledge of patients, whereas residents only work one half day per week and
are temporary. Id. at 740; see also Abstracts, 284 J. AM. MED. AsS'N 548 (2000)
(reporting a study of Medicaid clients by James M. Gill et aI., The Effect of
Continuity of Care on Emergency Department Use, which found that patients
with greater continuity of care were less likely to visit the emergency room a
single time and that high continuity of care was even more strongly associated
with a lower likelihood of visiting the emergency department more than once).
96. See Linda J. Weiss & Jan Blustein, Faithful Patients: The Effect of
Long-Term Physician-Patient Relationships on the Costs and Use of Health Care
by Older Americans, 86 AM. J. PuB. HEALTH 1742, 1743, 1745 (1996) (studying
Americans who were sixty-five or older, who participated in the Medicare
Current Beneficiary Survey in 1991, and who had a usual source of care, and
finding that patients who had continuous relationships with a physician for ten
years or more spent $495.61 less for Medicare Part A benefit reimbursements
and $316.78 less for Part B reimbursement costs than patients who had a
relationship with their physician that had gone on for one year or less).
97. See Walter W. Rosser & Jan Kasperski, The Benefits of a Trusting
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In sum, medical research on continuity and discontinuity in
provider care has established that the involuntary loss of a
physician is a significant physical and psychological hardship that
may be experienced by the patient for an extended period. 98 The
rules applying to restrictive covenants and their proper
interpretation should serve to encourage provider continuity in
health care, not undermine it.

2. The Physician's Ethical Duties
While forced discontinuity of care may have detrimental effects
for the patient when it occurs because of a restrictive covenant, 99 it
is equally troublesome for the physician. The American Medical
Association ("AMA") Official Guidelines state that once a physicianpatient relationship is formed, the physician has a legal and ethical
duty to continue providing care as long as the patient needs it. lOa
When a physician must terminate the patient relationship due to a
restrictive covenant, she must simultaneously fulfill this ethical
obligation. Doing so requires that the physician give the patient
reasonable notice of termination, as well as sufficient opportunity to
find an alternative provider. 101 The AMA provides steps that a
physician should follow in terminating the relationship, including
providing the patient with a reason for terminating the relationship,
continuing to provide treatment while the patient attempts to locate
Physician·Patient Relationship, 50 J. FAM. PRAc. 329, 329-30 (2001). The study
found that certain behaviors of physicians are associated with enhanced trust of
patients, including comforting and caring, demonstrating competency,
encouraging and asking questions, and explaining medical issues. Further, the
factors that influence trust in a negative manner include system intrusions on
the relationship, such as mandating screening tests for all and disallowing the
ordering of specific tests. The study also found that patients trusted physicians
salaried on a fee-for-service basis more than they trusted physicians salaried by
HMOs. [d.
98. See supra notes 84-98 and accompanying text.
99. See Berg, supra note 6, at 31-36 (discussing in detail the harm to the
physician-patient relationship, particularly to those patients who are
hospitalized, that results from the enforcement of physician restrictive
covenants).
100. See AMA, Ending the Patient-Physician Relationship (Mar. 7, 2005),
http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/category/4609.html.
101. See, e.g., Payton v. Weaver, 182 Cal. Rptr. 225,229 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982)
(upholding the rule that physicians may terminate the patient-physician
relationship as long as they give notice to the patient and the patient has
sufficient opportunity to secure care from another physician); Ricks v. Budge, 64
P.2d 208, 211-12 (Utah 1937) (holding that the failure to satisfy the duty to
notify the patient when the physician terminates the relationship can result in
abandonment liability if the patient suffers an injury as a result of the
termination).
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a new provider, recommending a new provider at the patient's
request, and transferring the patient's files to another physician
Many physicians are
only with the patient's permission. 102
prohibited from contacting their former patients under restrictive
covenants and are therefore unable to fulfill these legal and ethical
olga
bl ' t'Ions. 103
The physician-patient relationship is unlike most other business
relationships.
When a physician must terminate his or her
relationship with a patient because of a restrictive covenant, the
patient may suffer the consequences physically. In most other
cases, the customer who is denied the service of the professional
under a noncompetition clause is harmed only financially. Because
physicians have an ethical duty to put the welfare of their patients
above their own, a noncompetition clause undermines those ethics
when it places the employers' financial interests above patients'
interests. 104 Thus, physician restrictive covenants should be viewed
in a very different manner from covenants existing in other business
relationships. The potential harm to the patient should playa more
active role in determining whether or not to enforce a restrictive
covenant.

3. The Realities of Modern Medicine
Courts often do not declare physician restrictive covenants
injurious to the public because patients can still see the physician of
their choice-albeit at a location that may be undesirable. 105 In
some cases, this is highly impractical. The average geographic scope
for restrictive covenants that are enforced is 33.9 miles. lOS This can
be a great distance to be forced to drive to see one's physician of
choice, especially if a patient is ill and in urgent need of a doctor.
Moreover, the geographic scope fails to account for the quality of the
102. See AMA CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS §§ 8.11, 8.115 (1996); AMA, supra
note 100; see also Sleweon v. Burke, Murphy, Constanza & Cuppy, 712 N.E.2d
517, 520 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999) (discussing a physician who sued his attorneys in
part for mismanagement of his patients' files after he breached a covenant-notto-compete).
103. See, e.g., Jeff Sturgeon, Prevented from Practicing, ROANOKE TIMES,
Mar. 18,2001, at 1; see also Bloomington Urological Assocs., S.C. v. Scaglia, 686
N.E.2d 389, 394 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997) (upholding a covenant-not-to-compete
between physicians but reversing contempt conviction of doctor who tried to
contact a former patient to inquire about his condition under AMA Code § 8.11).
104. See Loeser, supra note 9, at 287.
105. See Keeley v. Cardiovascular Surgical Assocs., P.C., 510 S.E.2d 880, 885
(Ga. Ct. App. 1999) (upholding covenant-not-to-compete as reasonable because
the plaintiff "attracted patients and referrals from throughout the designated
area").
106. See Empirical Study, supra note 41, at 51l.
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hospital outside the covenant area or for patients who are generally
immobile, have no access to vehicular transportation, or do not have
the financial resources to travel so far to visit their physician.
Further, the current rule of reason analysis of physician
restrictive covenants also fails to address the fundamental role that
Preferred Provider Organization ("PPO")IHMO payment schemes
now play in the United States health care system. More is involved
today with a restrictive covenant than the inconvenience associated
with the distances patients may have to travel to continue seeing
their physician. Many managed care networks are highly localized.
A physician subject to a restrictive covenant may move to a new
town and receive staff privileges at a new hospital that is fairly close
to the former patient. For the patient, if the new hospital in the new
town is not part of the patient's HMO or PPO network, the patient
may well receive no benefits or, at best, reduced benefits from the
patient's health insurer. This lack of health insurance coverage may
mean that even a small change in physician location can deprive the
patient of the doctor's services. Thus, the evolving structure of
107
managed care can exacerbate the effects of restrictive covenants.
In addition, the duration of the covenant may be quite long.
Courts have routinely upheld covenants lasting up to five years,108
107. As the health care industry becomes more integrated, physicians
combine or affiliate with one another to control costs and expand their access to
patients through managed care plans. This process is reflected in the dramatic
growth of HMOs, entities which combine health care delivery and financing in
one prepaid capitative benefit plan. See FuRROW ET AL., supra note 3, § 9-10.
Additionally,
the number of Americans in HMOs rose rapidly from fifteen million in
1984 to more than fifty million in 1996. . . . In 1983, about four
percent of private-sector employees belonged to an HMO. By 2000,
ninety-two percent of workers at companies with ten or more
employees were in managed care.
William G. Kopit, Price Competition in Hospital Markets: The Significance of
Managed Care, 35 J. HEALTH L. 291, 297-98 (2002) (footnote omitted). However,
the amount of workers covered by "more restrictive HMOs has remained stable
since 1998," and the amount covered by "preferred provider organizations has
grown from [thirty-five] percent in 1998 to [forty-one] percent in 2000," and
American society has seen somewhat of a backlash against managed care. Id.
(footnote omitted).
The integration of health care delivery creates new
contractual concerns for physicians. To effectively compete for patients,
physicians join HMOs or form their own associations. In today's medical
marketplace, physicians are more likely than ever to be employees, rather than
owners or partners. See David J. Schiller, What You Should Bargain for in a
Restrictive Covenant, MED. ECON., July 11, 1994, at 51, 5l.
108. See Rash v. Toccoa Clinic Med. Assocs., 320 S.E.2d 170, 171 (Ga. 1984)
(three years); Dick v. Geist, 693 P.2d 1133, 1135 (Idaho Ct. App. 1985) (two
years); Prairie Eye Ctr., Ltd. v. Butler, 768 N.E.2d 414, 417 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002)
(two years); Weber v. Tillman, 913 P.2d 84, 87 (Kan. 1996) (two years).
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explaining that this duration provides employers with a reasonable
period of time to hire new doctors and gives those doctors sufficient
time to demonstrate their competence to patients. 109

4. Physician Immobility
When considering the reasonableness of the physician
restrictive covenant, courts fail to recognize that most physicians
are relatively immobile in terms of state licensing and practice
area. uo A physician must be licensed to practice in each state in
which he or she desires to practice;1l1 no national physician licensing
system currently exists. u2 Thus, a physician forced to move out of
one state must pay for and pass the licensing examination in the
new state in order to practice his craft. Accordingly, the power to
terminate a physician and leave him subject to a restrictive
covenant is a significant power in the hands ofthe employer. u3
Courts often opine that physicians are not restricted from
109. See Pollack v. Calimag, 458 N.W.2d 591, 599 (Wisc. Ct. App. 1990)
("Reasonableness [of duration requirements) depends upon the period of time
required to obliterate in the minds of the . . . customers the identification
formed during the period of the ... employment." (quoting Fields Found., Ltd. v.
Christensen, 309 N.W.2d 125, 133 (Wisc. Ct. App. 1981»). Courts will not
uphold covenants of unlimited duration. Rakestraw v. Lanier, 30 S.E. 735, 735
(Ga. 1898) (striking down a covenant for unlimited duration); House of Vision,
Inc. v. Hiyane, 225 N.E.2d 21, 22, 25 (Ill. 1967) (invalidating a covenant lasting
the life of the contracting physician); Darrow v. Kolczun, No. 90CA004759, 1991
WL 35120, at *2 (Ohio Ct. Api>. Mar. 6, 1991) (calling a noncompete
fundamentally flawed for being unlimited in duration).
110. Physicians must comply with state licensing laws. See FuRROW ET AL.,
supra note 3, § 3-1. Compliance with state regulations and licensing laws is
both time consuming and costly. See MARK A. HALL ET AL., HEALTH CARE LAW
AND ETHICS 810 (6th ed. 2003); Kerry A. Kearney, Medical Licensure: An
Impediment to Interstate Telemedicine, 9 HEALTH LAW (ABA HEALTH LAw
SECTION), No.4, 1997, at 14, 14. Doctors who violate licensing statutes risk
numerous sanctions including civil and criminal penalties, disciplinary
proceedings, Medicare debarment, invalidation of mandatory malpractice
insurance, and removal from specialty boards. See FURROW ET AL, supra note 3,
§ 3-11; HALL ET. AL, supra, at 815-16.
111. See generally FuRROW ET AL, supra note 3, §3-1.
112. See Susan E. Volkert, Telemedicine: Rx for the Future of Health Care, 6
MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 147,177-80 (1999-2000) (discussing the need
for a national licensing system).
113. See Peter B. Jurgeleit, Note, Physician Employment Under Managed
Care: Toward a Retaliatory Discharge Cause of Action for HMO-Affiliated
Physicians, 73 IND. L.J. 255, 276 & n.110 (1997) (citing Lawrence E. Blades,
Employment at Will vs. Individual Freedom: On Limiting the Abusive Exercise
of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1404, 1405-06 (1967) (arguing that the
nonunion employee's immobility makes the absolute right of discharge the
employer's prime source of power over the employee».
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practicing all medicine, only that which they were practicing for the
contracted employer.114 A license to practice medicine is a general
license: the physician can practice any type of medicine he
chooses.l15 Thus, it is true that a specialist such as a dermatologist
could stay in a restricted area if he chose to practice general
medicine instead of dermatology. However, this view ignores the
reality of the situation.
Physicians typically train for years to acquire the requisite
expertise for their chosen specialty (including even the broader
fields of family practice or internal medicine), and this investment of
time would, for most physicians, need to be repeated to shift
practices areas. In addition, the physician is not likely board
certified for other medical work. 116 Board certification is a step
above licensing. It means that a physician has been trained and
supervised in a specialty and has demonstrated competence in an
117
examination process.
To achieve board certification, a physician
typically must complete a three-to-seven-year residency. During
this training, the physician must participate in and conduct a
minimum number of medical procedures. Following the residency
training, the physician must pass both an oral and written
examination in a specific area (e.g., internal medicine, family
practice, or obstetrics and gynecology).118
The days of the Norman Rockwell era in which the doctor
treats everyone in the community for every ailment are over. The
requirement of board certification affects the ability of physicians to
practice in multiple ways. 119 For example, lack of certification affects
114. See Berg, supra note 6, at 23.
115. See FuRRow ET AL., supra note 3, § 3-5.
116. Doctors must be licensed by a state to practice medicine. See HALL ET
AL., supra note 110, at 811. Thus, doctors can practice medicine without being
"certified." See Laura Meckler, Periodic Reviews Urged for Health Care
Professionals, REG., Oct. 24, 1998, at 20 (arguing for periodic review of
professional credentials). However, these minimal licensing standards only
serve to ensure that "the most egregiously incompetent health professionals are
prohibited from practicing." Id. (quoting former Senator George Mitchell,
Chairman, Pew Health Professions Commission).
117. Am. Bd. of Med. Specialists, Ask AMBS: F AQ, What Does It Mean for a
Doctor to Be Board Certified?, http://www.abms.orglfaq.asp#DBC (last visited
Jan. 24, 2006).
118. AMA,
Physician
Education,
Licensure,
and
Certification,
http://www.ama-assn.orglaps/physcred.html (last visited Jan. 24, 2006).
119. For an example of the potential trouble of practicing medicine without
being board certified, see Julie Bell, Recovery in Works at Md. General:
Scandal-Scarred Hospital Makes Changes That Aid in Regaining Its Patients
and Its Credibility, BALT. SUN, July 17, 2005, at 1A. Maryland General
Hospital was subject to multiple lawsuits when many of its physicians were not
board certified in the areas in which they were performing. For example, one
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salary, the ability to obtain and the cost of malpractice insurance,
the validity of informed consent,120 admission to hospital staffs,
election to membership in professional societies, and credibility as
an expe rt WI·tness. 121
In recent years, the United States has suffered from a shortage
of physicians particularly in the area of primary care,122 which is
obviously a further threat to patients receiving adequate health
123
care. Restrictive covenants additionally restrict patients' access to
physicians of their choosing. 124
Some communities are truly
half of the anesthesiology department was not board certified. The hospital
then reformed their organization to employ only physicians who are board
certified. Id.
120. Howard v. Univ. of Med. and Dentistry of N.J., 800 A.2d 73, 83 (N.J.
2002) (finding that a physician's misrepresentation to a patient regarding board
certification and experience affected the validity of consent obtained in a
malpractice suit); see also John J. Smith, Legal Implications of Specialty Board
Certification, 17 J. LEGAL MED. 73,77-78 (1996).
121. See Marsingill v. O'Malley, 58 P.3d 495, 501 (Alaska 2002) (recognizing
that courts have allowed admission of evidence of lack of board certification in
"cross-examination or in rebuttal when it counteracts affinnative defense
evidence introduced to show a special degree of skill, knowledge, or relevant
expertise").
122. Physician shortage areas, designated by the Health Care Financing
Administration, are geographic "areas in the country which have an insufficient
supply of health care providers to meet the needs of the [surrounding]
population." Thomas D. Bixby, Network Adequacy: The Regulation of HMOs'
Network of Health Care Providers, 63 Mo. L. REV. 397, 409 n.122 (1998). "[1]n
1994, there were 2663 shortage areas in the United States designated as having
less than one primary care physician [(family practitioner, pediatrician, or
general internist)] per 3500 people." Kathleen M. Boozang, Western Medicine
Opens the Door to Alternative Medicine, 24 AM. J.L. & MED. 185, 200 n.92
(1998); see U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., HEALTH RES. & SERVS.
ADMIN., BUREAU OF HEALTH PROFESSIONS, SHORTAGE DESIGNATION,
http://bhpr.hrsa. gov/shortage (last visited Jan. 24, 2006) (providing links to
complete statistics on which areas of the country are designated as shortage
areas).
123. Approximately nineteen percent of the U.S. population, or forty-seven
million Americans, resided in physician shortage areas in 1994. Boozang, supra
note 122, at 200 n.92. Moreover, physician shortage areas tend to impact the
rural and inner-city poor far more severely than the rest of the country. "Most
private doctors are not located where poor people live and the number of poor
needing quality, continuous health care far exceeds the capacity of wellmeaning private physicians."
Anna-Katrina S. Christakis, Comment,
Emergency Room Gatekeeping: A New Twist on Patient Dumping, 1997 WIS. L.
REV. 295, 297 n.9 (citations omitted); see also Sidney D. Watson, Medicaid
Physician Participation: Patients, Poverty, and Physician Self-Interest, 21 AM.
J.L. & MED. 191, 196-97 (1995) (describing the shortage of private physicians in
inner-city and rural communities that result from low Medicaid
reimbursements).
124. Some courts have recognized that physician restrictive covenants may
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endangered by the shortage of available physicians caused by
restrictive covenants,125 but according to most courts, this does not
126
present a sufficient public interest.

D. Viewing the Public Interest with More Depth: Elevating the
Physician-Patient Relationship Through Application of a New Test
Although almost all states have faced and struggled with the
issues that arise under physician restrictive covenants,127 over the
past two decades, only a very small minority of courts has come to
grips with this contradiction. In some cases, this minority has
explored the depth of the doctor-patient relationship and how
restrictive covenants may affect individual patients. In Duffner v.
Alberty,128 an Arkansas appellate court found that the public interest
involved in a covenant-not-to-compete between orthopedic surgeons
included "the public right of availability of the [specialist] it prefers
to use."129 The court also found that the surgeons attempting to
enforce the covenant did not have a significant interest in the
patients with which the departing physician had a preexisting
relationship.130 While this brief opinion did not expound further on
this point, it is significant that the court felt it necessary to make a
distinction between those patients who may have desired a
harm the public if enforcement will lead to a shortage of health care providers
within the covenant areas. See, e.g., Odess v. Taylor, 211 So.2d 805, 809-10
(Ala. 1968) (refusing to uphold a restrictive covenant because of a recognized
need for more Ear, Nose, and Throat specialists within the area and thus "it
would be adverse to the public interest" to prevent the physician from practicing
medicine there); Fumo v. Med. Group of Mich. City, Inc., 590 N.E.2d 1103, 1109
(Ind. Ct. App. 1992); Karlin v. Weinberg, 390 A.2d 1161, 1169-70 (N.J. 1978);
Statesville Med. Group v. Dickey, 106 N.C. App. 669, 673-74, 418 S.E.2d 256,
259 (1992); Nalle Clinic Co. v. Parker, 101 N.C. App. 341, 344-45, 399 S.E.2d
363, 366 (1991); New Castle Orthopedic Assocs. v. Burns, 392 A.2d 1383, 138788 (Pa. 1978).
125. See Joe Manning, Frustration Grows with Racine's Doctor Shortage: As
Physicians Leave Town, Focus is on Dominant All Saints Health System,
MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, June 28, 1998, at Dl.
126. See, e.g., Long v. Huffman, 557 S.W.2d 911, 915 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977)
(noting that the shortage of doctors was so "pandemic" that to lose a physician
in one area means that the physician will then be more available elsewhere).
127. For a representative sample, see Valley Med. Specialists v. Farber, 982
P.2d 1277 (Ariz. 1999); Farthing v. San Mateo Clinic, 299 P.2d 977 (Cal. Dist.
Ct. App. 1956); Univ. of Fla. Bd. of Tr. v. Sanal, 837 So.2d 512 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2003); Gen. Surgery, P.A. v. Suppes, 953 P.2d 1055 (Kan. Ct. App. 1998);
Oak Orchard Cmty. Health Ctr. v. Blasco, 800 N.Y.S.2d 277 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
2005); Mkparu v. Ohio Heart Care, Inc., 740 N.E.2d 293 (Ohio Ct. App. 1999);
Hosp. Consultants, Inc. v. Potyka, 531 S.W.2d 657 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975).
128. 718 S.W.2d 111 (Ark. Ct. App. 1986).
129. [d. at 113-14.
130. [d. at 114.
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continuation of their relationship with the departing physician and
those who had never seen that physician. 131 While not explicitly
addressing the rights of individual patients to choose their
physicians, the Duffner court was one of the earliest at least to
identify the individual patients as parties that must be considered
as part of the public policy inquiry.
Other courts have examined the issue of patient choice more
closely, but only when the surrounding circumstances force them to
do SO.132 For instance, in Iredell Digestive Disease Clinic, P.A. v.
Petrozza,133 the North Carolina Court of Appeals refused to enforce a
restrictive covenant that would have created at least a temporary
monopoly even though the duration and geographic scope of the
covenant were found reasonable. l34 In striking down a restrictive
covenant between gastroenterologists, the court stated that "[t]he
doctor-patient relationship is a personal one and we are extremely
hesitant to deny the patient-consumer any choice whatsoever,,,135
siding with the departing physician who argued the covenant would
create a shortage of gastroenterologists in the area. 136
Although this sort of geographical and statistical analysis can
be useful in constructing the underpinnings of a more thoughtful
public policy analysis, other courts have approached the analysis
from a different and factually based perspective. The Ohio Court of
131. Id.
132. See Pathology Consultants v. Gratton, 343 N.W.2d 428, 436 (Iowa 1984)
(refusing to enforce a covenant that would result in a monopoly on laboratory
services on the grounds that a monopoly was "not in the best interests of the
public"); Statesville Med. Group v. Dickey, 106 N.C. App. 669, 672-74, 418
S.E.2d 256, 258-60 (1992) (voiding a covenant-not-to-compete between
endocrinologists because the enforcement would have created a two-year
monopoly and would have deprived a rural community of the only
endocrinologist who both lived and worked therein). But see Canfield v. Spear,
254 N.E.2d 433, 435 (Ill. 1969) ("If a severe shortage exists in any particular
place [because of enforcement] young doctors will tend to move there, thus
alleviating the shortage.").
133. 92 N.C. App. 21, 373 S.E.2d 449 (1988). In Petrozza, a North Carolina
professional association of gastroenterologists sought enforcement of a
restrictive covenant that barred a departing physician-employee from practicing
for three years within twenty miles of the clinic's principal place of business and
within five miles of any hospital or office served by the corporation. Id. at 2223, 373 S.E.2d at 450-51.
134. See id. at 27, 30-31, 373 S.E.2d at 453, 455. "The creation of a
monopoly also raises the issue of the public's interest in having some choice in
the selection of a physician." Id. at 31, 373 S.E.2d at 455. The court also noted
throughout the opinion that gastroenterologists are likely to be needed in an
emergency context, raising the stakes in the public interest analysis. Id.
135. Id. at 31, 373 S.E.2d at 455.
136. See id. at 28, 31, 373 S.E.2d at 453, 455.
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Appeals in Ohio Urology, Inc. v. Poll,137 for instance, overturned a
district-court referee's ruling that voi'ded restrictive covenants
between physicians per se but, in so doing, acknowledged that the
public policy consideration must include the rights of individual
patients. 13s
Notably, this court also stated that competition,
especially between doctors, must be encouraged. 1a9
Drawing on the Duffner and Petrozza decisions, the Arizona
Supreme Court rendered a thoughtful and in-depth analysis of the
physician-patient relationship and its effect on restrictive covenants
between doctors in Valley Medical Specialists v. Farber. 140 The
Arizona high court is one of the only courts in the nation to have
fully integrated the AMA guidelines into its public interest analysis.
The court upheld a lower court opinion that struck down a
restrictive covenant between pulmonologists partly because of the
"sensitive and personal nature of the doctor-patient relationship,"141
finding that "the doctor-patient relationship is special and entitled
to unique protection. It cannot be easily or accurately compared to
relationships in the commercial context."142 In so doing, the court
noted that while the AMA discouragement of restrictive covenants
was not binding on the physicians, it was relevant to the public
interest inquiry, especially in light of the fact that such agreements
between lawyers were illegal. 143 While the court did not rule that
covenants between physicians were per se against public policy, it
did warn that they must be "strictly construed" in light of their
impact on the doctor-patient relationship.l44

137. 594 N.E.2d 1027 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991). The trial-court referee's decision
relied heavily on AMA guidelines in banning the covenants. The appellate
court, however, held that the AMA guidelines only discourage restrictive
covenants, and do net ban them. [d. at 1030-31. For a further discussion of
restrictive covenants in Ohio, see generally Pierre H. Bergeron, Navigating the
"Deep and Unsettled Sea" of Covenant Not to Compete Litigation in Ohio: A
Comprehensive Look, 31 U. TOL. L. REV. 373 (2000).
138. Ohio Urology, 594 N.E.2d at 1030.
139. [d. (citing an AMA provision as support, the court stated that
"competition among physicians is to be encouraged").
140. 982 P.2d 1277 (Ariz. 1999).
141. [d. at 1285.
142. [d. at 1283.
143. [d. at 1282-83.
144. [d. at 1286.
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III. SOLUTION STOCKPILE:.PROFFERED SOLUTIONS FOR EVALUATING
PHYSICIAN RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS

The interests of incumbent patients must be considered in any
judicial evaluation of a physician restrictive covenant for two
reasons: the potential health risks created when incumbent patients
are not allowed to continue care with their doctor and the
importance of allowing physicians to fulfill their professional duties
to their patients. The rule of reason test as presently applied fails to
accord proper weight to these considerations. The courts must
fashion a new approach to bring incumbent patient interests to the
fore of the analysis. Several solutions to this problem have been
suggested by commentators and applied by courtS. 145
One potential solution discussed below is for the AMA to take a
stronger stance against physician restrictive covenants, much like
the American Bar Association ("ABA") guidelines, that courts can
146
then follow.
However, the author concludes that the courts should
apply a reformulated rule of reason test wherein incumbent patients
are treated as quasi third-party beneficiaries to physician restrictive
covenants. 147

The AMA's Indecision
Courts usually will enforce restrictive covenants against most
professionals; however, attorneys are a notable exception. Most
courts simply invalidate attorney restrictive covenants by citing a
l48
per se rule derived from the profession's own ethical standards.
The per se rule is an absolute bar to enforcement of any restriction
on a lawyer's right to practice. 149 Although the judiciary has applied
this per se rule to covenants between attorneys, such an approach
has not been adopted for physicians. Instead, when dealing with

A.

145. See infra notes 146-204 and accompanying text.
146. See infra notes 152-64 and accompanying text.
147. See infra Part V.
148. See, e.g., Anderson v. Aspelmeier, Fisch, Power, Warner & Engberg, 461
N.W.2d 598, 601-02 (Iowa 1990) (invalidating an agreement that stopped
payment of withdrawal benefits if the withdrawing partner committed an act
detrimental to the firm); Minge v. Weeks, 629 So. 2d 545 (La. Ct. App. 1993);
Denburg v. Parker Chapin Flattau & Klimpl, 624 N.E.2d 995 (N.Y. 1993);
Spiegel v. Thomas, Mann & Smith, P.C., 811 S.W.2d 528, 530-31 (Tenn. 1991)
(declaring unenforceable an agreement which provided that an employee who
withdrew from the firm would receive deferred compensation unless she
continued to practice law). But see Howard v. Babcock, 863 P.2d 150 (Cal.
1993); Haight, Brown & Bonesteel v. Superior Court, 285 Cal. Rptr. 3d 845 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1991); Jacob v. Norris, McLaughlin & Marcus, 588 A.2d 1287 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991), reu'd, 607 A.2d 142 (N.J. 1992).
149. See cases cited supra note 148.
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physician restrictive covenants, courts apply the same rule of reason
test as used for commercial parties. 150 Thus, despite the apparent
professional similarities between doctors and lawyers, the courts
have treated similar contractual relationships within the two
professions quite differently.151
One key reason for this disparity involves the divergent ethical
codes of the two professions. 152 The ABA Committee on Professional
Ethics has explicitly declared that restrictive covenants between
attorneys are unethical 153 whereas the AMA's position on the issue
has been neither clear nor consistent. 154
In 1933, the AMA declared that restrictive covenants were
unethical/55 but it subsequently reversed itself in 1960. 156 While
more recently the AMA has discouraged physician restrictive
covenants as "not in the public interest,,,157 it has come just short of
150. See Berg, supra note 6, at 4-6 ("[N)on-competition agreements between
physicians, like noncompetition agreements between attorneys, should be per se
invalid. ").
151. Robert W. Hillman, Law Firms and Their Partners: The Law and
Ethics of Grabbing and Leaving, 67 TEx. L. REV. 1, 20 (1988) ("The reasons for
distinguishing lawyering from other professions in this context are vague, and
it is questionable whether the availability of choice for the client is any less
critical when the professional engaged is a physician, for example, rather than a
lawyer."); see also Howard, 863 P.2d at 160; Karlin v. Weinberg, 390 A.2d 1161,
1171 (N.J. 1978) (Sullivan, J., dissenting) ("Both [the doctor-patient and
lawyer-client) relationships are consensual, highly fiduciary and peculiarly
dependent on the patient's or client's trust and confidence in the physician
consulted or attorney retained."); Ladd v. Hikes, 639 P.2d 1307, 1310-12 (Or. Ct.
App. 1982) (Buttler, J., dissenting) (arguing for the application of the per se rule
to doctors).
152. See AMERICAN MEDICAL AsSOCIATION, CURRENT OPINIONS OF THE
JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF THE AMERICAN MEDICAL AsSOCIATION: INCLUDING THE
PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL ETHICS AND RULES OF THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL, § E-9.06
(1982). For a comparison of the AMA advisory rules to the ABA rules of ethics,
see Karlin, 390 A.2d at 1167-68 & n.6.
153. See ABA Comm. on Prof! Ethics, Formal Op. 300 (1961).
154. In 1960, the AMA focused primarily upon the fairness of a
noncompetition agreement as between the affected doctors, indicating that
noncompetition agreements are not inherently unethical. See Berg, supra note
6, at 6-9. The AMA, however, did acknowledge, at least, that questions
remained as to whether enforcement of an agreement was harmful to the
public. See id. at 7.
155. See id. at 6-7 (citing AMA, 1846-1958 DIGEST OF OFFICIAL ACTIONS 123
(1959».
156. See id. at 7 (citing AMA, OPINIONS AND REPORTS OF THE JUDICIAL
COUNCIL 25 (1960».
157. AMA, CURRENT OPINIONS OF THE COUNCIL ON ETHICS AND JUDICIAL
AFFAIRS § 9.02 (1989). Several other provisions of the AMA's Code of Medical
Ethics state that "[flree choice of physicians is the right of every individual,"
AMA CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS § 9.06 (1994), and that competition among
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calling the pacts unethical, except in particular cases where the
covenants are "excessive in geographic scope or duration. . . or if
they fail to make reasonable accommodation of patients' choice of
.. ,,158
Ph YSICIan.
Furthermore, the AMA's guarded warning on restrictive
covenants is merely advisory and does not bind AMA members,
159
unlike the Model Rules of Professional Conduct of the ABA.
The
AMA concedes most states will enforce reasonable noncompetition
agreements. 160 The AMA even goes so far as to suggest that
physicians forming a medical practice should consider the
advantages of restrictive and liquidated damages covenants. 161
Many courts do not consider the AMA opinions because restrictive
covenants are not expressly prohibited by them and because the
AMA is not an agency of the government. 162 And, while most states
have adopted some form of the ABA's Model Rules, AMA opinions
163
have been neither adopted nor codified.
Although AMA opinions do not bind their members, the AMA is
164
If the AMA took
a persuasive, policy-guiding body for physicians.
a stronger stance against physician restrictive covenants, courts
might be convinced of the importance of the public policies against
oppressive restrictive covenants. However, because the AMA is not
a government agency, even a stronger statement by the AMA may
physicians is not only ethical but encouraged, id. § 6.11.
158. AMA CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS § 9.02 (2004); see also Cathy Tokarski,
No Way Out: When Practice Management Firms Fail, Restrictive Covenants Can
Make a Bad Situation Worse, AM. MED. NEWS, Nov. 9, 1998, at 27
159. See AMA Judicial Council, Op. 9.06 (1982). For a comparison of the
AMA advisory rules to the ABA rules of ethics, see Karlin v. Weinberg, 390 A.2d
1161, 1167-68 (N.J. 1978).
160. See Michael R. Sullivan, Note, Covenants-not-to-compete and
Liquidated Damages Clauses: Diagnosis and Treatment for Physicians, 46 S.C.
L. REV. 505,514 (1995) (citing Andrea Cooper, Restrictive Covenants, 248 JAMA
3091, 3091 (1982».
161. [d.
Liquidated damages covenants can be just as troubling as
covenants-not-to-compete because they may persuade a physician to choose
economic interests over patient interests, thus harming the doctor-patient
relationship. See Joelyn Knopf Levy, Because Judges Went to Law School, Not
Medical School: Restrictive Covenants in the Practices of Law and Medicine, 30
J. HEALTH & Hasp. L. 89, 98-100 (1997) (arguing that courts should treat
restrictive covenants between physicians the same way they treat those
between attorneys).
162. There are some notable exceptions. See, e.g., Valley Med. Specialists v.
Farber, 982 P.2d 1277, 1283 (Ariz. 1999) (holding that the similarity between
AMA discouragement of restrictive covenants and the ABA's ban on such to be
relevant to the public policy inquiry).
163. See Knopf, supra note 161, at 93.
164. See AMA, About AMA Policy, http://www.ama-assn.org/amaJ
pub/category/8151.html (last visited Jan. 24, 2006).
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not be a sufficient solution.

B.

The Blue Pencil Rule: Make Your Own Contract
The blue pencil rule has been used by courts to modify
unreasonable covenants-not-to-compete. The majority approach is
exemplified by the U.S. District Court of the Southern District of
Indiana in Product Action International, Inc. u. Mero. 165 The Indiana
court stated that the blue pencil rule allows a court to strike
unreasonable portions of a covenant-not-to-compete if those portions
are logically and grammatically severable from the remainder of the
contract. 166 Although this approach allows a court to enforce
reasonable terms in the contract, a court may not create a new
contract by adding new terms to which the parties did not agree. 167
This solution may work to protect an employee from undue hardship
or an employer's protectable interest. On the other hand, the blue
pencil is not a solution that protects a patient's interests. The blue
pencil doctrine does not force courts to consider an incumbent
patient's interests in a physician's covenant-not-to-compete. If
courts are forced to consider the patient's interests in the public
policy prong as proposed, the blue pencil doctrine may then be used
to ensure the covenant-not-to-compete is only as restrictive as
necessary to protect the employer's legitimate interest. However,
standing alone, the blue pencil doctrine does not do enough to
protect patients' interests.
Liquidated Damages
Many covenants-not-to-compete between physicians give the
contracting physician the option of paying liquidated damages in the
alternative to abiding by the geographical and time restrictions of
16B
the agreement.
Some courts and commentators argue that these
damages are less harmful to physicians and their patient
relationships than enforcement of the restrictive covenant through
injunctive relief. 169 The amounts of these damages are often
C.

165. 277 F. Supp. 2d 919 (S.D. Ind. 2003).
166. Id. at 926.
167. Id. at 928.
168. See, e.g., Farber, 982 P.2d at 1279; Dickinson Med. Group, P.A. v. Foote,
No. 834-K, 1984 WL 8208, at *3 (Del. Ch. May 10, 1984); Raymundo v.
Hammond Clinic Ass'n, 449 N.E.2d 276, 278 (Ind. 1983); see also Serena L.
Kafker, Golden Handcuffs: Enforceability of Non-Competition Clauses in
Professional Partnership Agreements of Accountants, Physicians, and Attorneys,
31 AM. Bus. L.J. 31, 40-41 (1993) (noting how common liquidated damages
clauses are in restrictive covenants).
169. See, e.g., Dental East, P.C. v. Westercamp, 423 N.W.2d 553, 555 (Iowa
Ct. App. 1988); see also Lowry, supra note 1, at 232 (noting that liquidated
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extremely high. 170 While arguments may be made that such
prOVISIons are a workable alternative for physicians who wish to
preserve relationships with their patients, the reality is that such
171
provisions are only an option for only the wealthiest physicians.
Additionally, viewing the payment of liquidated damages as making
a plaintiff whole in cases involving noncompete clauses between
physicians only furthers the problematic view that a physician's
patients are merely constituent parts of a commercial marketplace
and nothing more. It is also important to note that courts that have
found covenants-not-to-compete between physicians to be
unenforceable for public policy reasons have found alternative
liquidated damages clauses to be similarly void. 172

The Per Se Rule: The Pitfalls of Fighting Fire with Fire
Many highly respected judges and scholars advocate adopting
the per se rule, currently applied to analyze the validity of attorney
restrictive covenants, to physician restrictive covenants. 173 Both
Professor Berg174 and a variety of judges,175 argue that physicians

D.

damages act to compensate the former employer "without hindering the public's
choice of physicians").
170. See, e.g., Junkin v. Ne. Ark. Internal Med. Clinic, P.A., 42 S.W.3d 432,
435 (Ark. 2001) (stating that liquidated damages clause required payment of
$174,388 in instance of breach).
171. See generally Charles A. Sullivan, Revisiting the "Neglected Stepchild":
Antitrust Treatment of Postemployment Restraints of Trade, 1977 U. ILL. L.F.
621 (arguing that antitrust law should be applied to restrictive covenants).
172. See Junkin, 42 S.W.3d at 438 ("Common sense dictates that if a
restrictive covenant cannot be specifically enforced because it violates public
policy, then a related liquidated-damages provision also cannot be enforced.");
Duneland Emergency Physician's Med. Group v. Brunk, 723 N.E.2d 963, 967
(Ind. Ct. App. 2000) ("[BJecause the non-compete covenant is unenforceable,
Duneland is not entitled to liquidated damages. ").
173. See Berg, supra note 6 at 36-37; Richard P. Bergen, Practical
Considerations on Restrictive Covenants, 203 JAMA 197, 198 (1968); Hillman,
supra note 150, at 20; see also Odess v. Taylor, 211 So. 2d 805, 811 (Ala. 1968)
(emphasizing the similarities in the relationships between a doctor and patient
and lawyer and client: "[tJhe patient or client is not a 'customer"').
174. See Berg, supra note 6, at 36-37. She argues:
The inconsistent judicial treatment of restrictive covenants between
these two types of professionals cannot be justified. Indeed, the
philosophical and public policy underpinnings of the per se rule apply
with greater force to restrictive covenants between physicians than to
restrictive covenants between attorneys. Simply put, if the reasoning
behind the per se rule for attorneys is valid, the reasoning applies
even more strongly to physicians.
Id.
175. For example, Justice Sullivan, in Karlin v. Weinberg, states his
concerns eloquently:
The restrictive covenant, which the Court is upholding in principle,
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should be subjected to a per se rule against restrictive covenants,
just as lawyers are currently, since the per se rule provides for
greater protection for physician-employees as well as their patients.
Applying the per se rule to physician covenants is sometimes
advocated because it is an easy and efficient rule for courts to
apply. 176 If all physician covenants are presumed by courts to be
void, fewer cases will likely be brought, and those that are brought
are more easily decided, saving judicial resources. Another reason
for extending the per se rule to physicians is the law's inconsistent
treatment of two professions that seem to share a great many
similarities: physicians and attorneys.177 An apparent inconsistency
also exists between the high regard for a physician/patient
relationship at trial and the low regard for that same relationship
" ty 0 f care. 178
£,or con t lllUl
If state supreme courts were to adopt a per se rule for
restrictive covenants among physicians, as they are adopting
regarding attorneys, the criticisms directed at the current majority
use of the rule of reason test would be just as apt. Moreover, two
additional problems arise when a per se rule is applied to
physicians: 1) a per se rule is an utterly inflexible means of weighing
both the clients' and employers' interests and 2) though a physician
is not a plumber, many find it hard to believe that a physician is
sufficiently analogous to an attorney for the per se rule and its
.
Ie t0 app1y. 179
ratlOna
If a per se rule against restrictive covenants were applied to
physicians, many of their interests would be ignored and trampled.
Doctors who leave an organization may exploit personal and referral
relationships they gained while employed with the company.
Without some enforcement of restrictive covenants, individual
does violence to the concept of the physician-patient relationship. A
person requiring medical treatment and advice goes to the doctor of
his or her choice.... The relationship is so personal and so sensitive,
and the right of a patient to consult the physician of one's own choice
so fundamental, that a restrictive covenant which substantially
intrudes on that relationship and interferes with that fundamental
right should be held contrary to public policy.
Karlin v. Weinberg, 390 A.2d 1161, 1170-71 (N.J. 1978) (Sullivan, J.,
dissenting).
176. See Antitrust HealthCare Advancement Act of 1996: Hearing on H.R.
2925 Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary,. 104th Congo (1996) (statement of
Robert Pitofsky, Chairman, FTC), available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/
pitofsky/pithtl.htm.
177. See Odess, 211 So. 2d at 811; Berg, supra note 6, at 36-37.
178. See Di Dio, supra note 9, at 474-75.
179. See, e.g., Karlin, 390 A.2d at 1167-69; Ohio Urology, Inc. V. Poll, 594
N.E.2d 1027, 1030-32 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991).
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physicians would be permitted to pull patients away from the very
company that trained them and provided them with the knowledge
necessary to accommodate those patients. The medical profession is
a delicate one, involving many interests of many different parties,
and a per se rule against restrictive covenants would only serve to
ignore those different individual interests.
The primary shortcoming of the per se rule as applied to either
attorneys or physicians is that it assumes that a particular result is
always appropriate. The main thrust of this Article has not been to
discredit the need for restrictive covenants between physicians in all
contexts.
Rather, it has been to highlight the disturbing
incongruities that exist between the very complex web of
relationships and interests among doctors and patients and the
pitifully simple regime that many courts have adopted in order to
evaluate those relationships. In fact, the per se rule as it stands
regarding attorneys in nearly every jurisdiction is vulnerable to
these same criticisms. ISO California also has recognized this flaw in
the per se approach and has adopted a judicial mechanism, which
more closely resembles the rule of reason test, allowing more factors
than just the interest of the client to be taken into account. ISI
180. See Glenn S. Draper, Comment, Enforcing Lawyers' Covenants not to
compete, 69 WASH. L. REV. 161,174 (1994); Kalish, supra note 21, at 451.
181. See Howard v. Babcock, 863 P.2d 150, 156 (Cal. 1993) (upholding
noncompete clause in partnership agreement); see also Haight, Brown &
Bonesteel v. Superior Court, 285 Cal. Rptr. 845, 848 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991)
(upholding a restrictive covenant that financially penalized departing attorneys
by causing forfeiture of post-breakup fees). "These decisions [result partially
froml the fact that California's ethical code is slightly different from the Model
Code or Model Rules and can be read to allow enforcement of restrictive
covenants." John Ritsick, Ethical Concerns in Law Firm Breakups: Solicitation,
Restrictive Covenants, and Conflict Issues, 11 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 355, 362
(1998). California's Rules of Professional Conduct provide that "tal member [of
the State Barl shall not be a party to or participate in offering or making an
agreement ... [thatl restricts the right of a member to practice law." CAL.
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1-500(A) (2006). Similarly, Model Rule 5.6(a)
provides that "tal lawyer shall not participate in offering or making (a) a
partnership or employment agreement that restricts the rights of a lawyer to
practice after termination of the relationship." MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 5.6(a) (1983).
The Haight court, however, interpreted the
California state provision to prohibit only agreements which caused attorneys
to "refrain altogether from the practice of law." Haight, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 848.
The Haight court decided to expand its interpretation of Rule 1-500, in part,
based on an 1872 Civil Code. Id. at 847. Additionally, the court noted that
"Business and Professions Code section 16602 provides that '[alny partner may
. . . agree that he will not carry on a similar business within a specified
[geographic areal.'" Id. The Haight court noted the 1872 provision had "never
been amended to prohibit attorneys from availing themselves of the contractual
rights contained therein." Id. For a further discussion of the Haight case, see
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Moreover, a number of scholars have argued for the application
of the rule of reason to attorney restrictive covenants to permit for
more flexibility.182 For example, Professor Wilcox argues for the
termination of the per se rule for lawyers. He contends that it is "[a]
fundamental principle of contract law" that "any harm to the public
resulting from enforcement [of restrictive covenants] must not
outweigh the value of the interests protected by the restriction.,,183
The per se rule, therefore, wrongly assumes that the public interest
will always outweigh the benefits to law firms, or physician
employers, who wish restrictive covenants enforced. l84 Ai:, noted
above, physician-employers may wish to protect patient lists;
likewise, law firms may wish to protect client patronage in matters
already handled by the firm and protecting new matters involving
. t'lng cl'lent s. 185
eXls
From a practical perspective, implementing a per se rule would
be nothing short of revolutionary in most jurisdictions and would
likely be met with resistance. While the public policy prong of the
rule of reason test must be strengthened significantly, it should not
devour the other prongs as it has in most jurisdictions regarding
lawyers. The fact that many of the rational underpinnings of the
per se rule have been reiterated and buttressed in this Article does
not mean that a per se rule is the appropriate result. Advocating
such would simply be replacing one overly simplistic and oppressive
regime with another.

generally Kirstan Penasack, Note, Abandoning the Per Se Rule Against Law
Firm Agreements Anticipating Competition: Comment on Haight, Brown &
Bonesteel v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 5 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 889
(1992).
182. See, e.g., Kafker, supra note 168, at 58 ("As the practice of law has
become more and more a business, the justification for treating legal
partnerships differently from other professions has become less compelling,
notwithstanding the ethical code ofthe legal profession. A reasonable forfeiture
clause would not impose an absolute restriction and would protect the dominant
interest of the client as well as those of the departing partner and the firm.");
Robert M. Wilcox, Enforcing Lawyer Non-Competition Agreements While
Maintaining the Profession: The Role of Conflict of Interest Principles, 84 MINN.
L. REV. 915, 937-41 (2000); Wm. C. Turner Herbert, Comment, Let's Be
Reasonable: Rethinking the Prohibition Against Noncompete Clauses in
Employment Contracts Between Attorneys in North Carolina, 82 N.C. L. REV.
249, 266-78 (2003) (urging the revision of ethical rules to permit law firms to
use noncompetition agreements with the application of the common law
reasonableness standard).
183. Wilcox, supra note 182, at 965.
184. See id. at 932.
185. See supra notes 48-60 and accompanying text.
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E.

The Antitrust Approach: Another Method of Oversimplification
Over the years, physician-employees have sought to use federal
lS6
and state antitrust laws to challenge covenants-not-to-compete.
This antitrust analysis may be viewed as a variation of the per se
rule described above, as the restrictive covenant, if in violation of
antitrust rules, will not be enforced due to its anti competitive
effects. Such an analysis, proffered by Charles Sullivan and Arthur
Di Dio, among others, does not offer the enhanced flexibility that a
ls7
more nuanced rule of reason approach would provide.
Professor Sullivan observes that the common law rule of reason
for restrictive covenants overvalues the individual interests of the
employer and employee, while failing to sufficiently consider the
agreement's broader anticompetitive effects. ISS He convincingly
argues that the application of federal antitrust principles would
demand a more precise analysis for the noncompete agreement's
impact on the relevant market because these principles would better
lS9
assess the overall reasonableness of anti-competition agreements.
However, this antitrust approach fails to differentiate the unique
and special relationship between physicians and their patients from
other commercial relationships.190 Moreover, it fails to take note of
the difficulties that physicians have using antitrust laws to void
restrictive covenants.
In his article, The Legal Implications of Noncompetition
Agreements in Physician Contracts, Di Dio discusses the many legal
hurdles a physician will face in using federal antitrust law to
19l
The first
challenge the validity of a noncom petition agreement.
challenge is jurisdictional: whether or not federal antitrust law is
applicable requires that the noncompetition agreement (or rather,
the enforcement thereof) substantially affects interstate
commerce. 192 Although the Supreme Court held that the "learned
professions," including attorneys 193 and physicians,194 are part of
186. See, e.g., Blank v. Preventive Health Programs, 504 F. Supp. 416, 41820 (S.D. Ga. 1980).
187. See Di Dio, supra note 9, at 464-71; Charles A. Sullivan, Revisiting the
"Neglected Stepchild": Antitrust Treatment of Postemployment Restraints of
Trade, 1977 U. ILL. L.F. 621, 625-32.
188. Sullivan, supra note 187, at 642.
189. Id. at 643.
190. See id. at 625-26.
191. See Di Dio, supra note 9, at 465-71. See generally Jill Moore Mayo,
Comment, The Antitrust Ramifications of Noncompetition Clauses in the
Partnership and Employment Agreements of Doctors, 30 Loy. L. REV. 307 (1984).
192. See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000).
193. Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 787 (1975).
194. Arizona v. Maricopa County Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 348-49 (1982); see
Carl F. Ameringer, Federal Antitrust Policy and Physician Discontent: Defining
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trade and commerce for Sherman Act purposes, the problem has
been demonstrating that restrictive covenants have an
anticompetitive effect.195 Di Dio outlines in detail the potential
difficulties a physician may have in establishing such an
196
anticompetitive effect. He states:
This anticompetitive effect must occur in the relevant market;
it is not sufficient that the plaintiff demonstrate that the
covenant hindered the plaintiffs ability alone to compete in
the market. That anticompetitive effects "must be judged in
relation to the market" rather than in relation to the plaintiff
alone is a potential barrier to197a successful antitrust challenge
to a covenant not to compete.
He concludes that most courts find that the procompetitive
justifications of a restrictive covenant outweigh any "anticompetitive
effects. ,,198
Moreover, a 1982 Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") complaint
leveled at the medical community ordered, among other things, that
the AMA cease and desist from declaring that restrictive covenants
199
in physician contracts were unethical.
The basis for this FTC
order came from economists who argued that "ethical restrictions on
advertising, solicitation, and contract practice increased costS.,,200
For a time, the nation trusted that decentralized, competitive
markets in health care and insurance would constrain costs while
encouraging quality.201 Now, some commentators suggest that a lack
of regulation of both HMO mergers and physician practice groups
has led to an increase in anticompetitive behavior that federal
enforcement is either unwilling or unable to contro1. 202
Moments in the Struggle for Congressional Relief, 27 J. HEALTH POL. POL'y & L.
543, 549 (2002).
195. The requirement that the antitrust activity substantially affect
interstate commerce was explained by the Court in Summit Health, Ltd. v.
Pinhas, 500 U.S. 322 (1991). The Court stated, "[t]he competitive significance
of [a single surgeon's] exclusion from the market must be measured ... by a
general evaluation of the impact of the restraint on other participants and
potential participants in the market from which he has been excluded." [d. at
332.
196. See Di Dio, supra note 9, at 469-71.
197. [d.
198. See id. at 470-71.
199. See Ameringer, supra note 194, at 550-51.
200. [d. at 550.
201. See Thomas L. Greaney, Whither Antitrust? The Uncertain Future Of
Competition Law in Health Care, 21 HEALTH AFF., Mar.lApr. 2002, at 185, 186;
see also Clark C. Havighurst, Doctors and Hospitals: An Antitrust Perspective on
Traditional Relationships, 1984 DUKE L. J. 1071, 1072-74.
202. Greaney, supra note 201, at 186; John A. Powers, Note, The Stifling of
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Another reason for the possible increase of antitrust activity is
that lower courts "find themselves at sea" trying to interpret and
apply the complex economic inquiry required to determine if
antitrust activity has resulted in "cause-effect relationships between
professional restraints and economic outcome.,,203
So, even if
antitrust legislation may be applicable to physician restrictive
covenants, the complexity, cost, and uncertain nature of legal action
in this area cannot currently provide a practical solution to the
problems arising from restrictive covenants.
If these jurisdictional requirements are met, the courts will
apply the rule of reason to covenants-not-to-compete. Therefore,
such an analysis provides no nuanced solution to the problem of
physician restrictive covenants; it simply clears the way for federal
antitrust law to augment the rule of reason test used by a majority
204
of jurisdictions.
Such an approach is helpful only to the extent
that a court may take such factors into consideration as a
component of a more far-reaching factual inquiry and subsequent indepth analysis.

IV. BORROWING FROM THIRD-PARTY BENEFICIARIES: AN
ENLIGHTENED RULE OF REASON TEST

The application of the current rule of reason framework to
physician restrictive covenants fails to adequately protect the
physician-patient relationship. In balancing the freedom to contract
and this special relationship, courts should not automatically favor
the employer's interest in protecting its business interests over the
physician-employee's relationship with his or her patients.
Absent from current rule of reason analysis is a recognition that
protecting the physician-patient relationship serves important
205
public policy and health values.
Although an employer may have
legitimate, and even compelling reasons, for enforcing a restrictive
covenant in some specific contexts,206 these facts provide no
justification for abandoning a priori the importance of a patient's
continuing relationship with a physician in all situations. An
evaluation of a physician restrictive covenant should be cabined by a
Competition by the Antitrust Laws: The Irony of the Health Care Industry, 15 J.
L. & HEALTH 223, 224 (2000-2001).
203. Greaney, supra note 201, at 189.
204. Di Dio, supra note 9, at 469 ("Under the federal antitrust laws, a
covenant-not-to-compete is valid if it is ancillary to the main business purpose
of a lawful contract and necessary to protect the covenantee's legitimate
property interests, which require that the covenants be as limited as is
reasonable to protect the covenantee's interests.").
205. See supra notes 84-98 and accompanying text.
206. See supra notes 48-55 and accompanying text.
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guiding principle recognizing that the interest of incumbent patients
to maintain their relationship with their physician has value and
deserves greater protection in appropriate contexts.
Courts must not permit an employer to squelch physicianpatient relationships for any reason. On the other hand, not all
physician-patient relationships are deserving of a high level of
207
protection.
In short, courts must evaluate the strength of a
physician-employee's claim for nonenforcement of a restrictive
covenant on a content-specific basis, providing greater scrutiny at
times, while applying a normal rule of reason standard to other
cases.
The current rule of reason treats all physician-patient
relationships as having equal value to the patient and the patient's
health.208 The result of this analytical approach is decisions that
209
often appear arbitrary and unfair.
Most courts look at the public
policy prong of the rule of reason test to only require that a
minimum number of physicians reside in a particular area, rather
than taking into account weighty issues such as preservation of
patient choice, encouragement of competition between physicians,
210
quality of patient care, and continuity ofthat care.
Such a greater
content-specific approach may be had by applying a quasi thirdparty beneficiary analysis to the incumbent patients under the
public policy prong of the rule of reason.
207. Some physician-patient relationships are of short duration due to the
type of medicine a doctor practices. A meeting with a radiologist generally will
not lead to a long-term health care relationship. Other doctors, such as
oncologists, see a patient frequently and develop a deeper and continuing
relationship with the patient.
208. Cf Iredell Digestive Disease Clinic, P.A. v. Petrozza, 92 N.C. App. 21,
29-31, 373 S.E.2d 449, 454-55 (1988) (focusing its rule of reason analysis on the
availability of any gastroenterologist to the community rather than focusing on
availability of a particular gastroenterologist to the community), affd, 324 N.C.
327, 377 S.E.2d 750 (1989).
209. See Prairie Eye Ctr., Ltd. v. Butler, 768 N.E.2d 414, 421 (Ill. App. Ct.
2002) ("Despite our sympathy for the rights of patients to choose their own
doctors, we are constrained to follow the long line of precedent ... finding noncompetition agreements enforceable in the medical profession." (internal
citations omitted»; Bloomington Urological Assocs., SC v. Scaglia, 686 N.E.2d
389, 394 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997) (acknowledging the sacrosanct relationship
between the contracting physician and his patients before declaring a
noncompete agreement between physicians enforceable); Willman v. Beheler,
499 S.W.2d 770, 777 (Mo. 1973) (holding a covenant-not-to-compete valid even
though a shortage of surgeons existed in the area because there existed such
shortages in many areas).
210. See, e.g., Duffner v. Alberty, 718 S.W.2d 111, 113-14 (Ark. Ct. App.
1986). But see, e.g., Valley Med. Specialists v. Farber, 982 P.2d 1277, 1283
(Ariz. 1999).
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A third-party beneficiary is "[a] person who, though not a party
to a contract, stands to benefit from the contract's performance.,,211
There are two separate classes of third-party beneficiaries: intended
beneficiaries and incidental beneficiaries. A party outside of a
contract qualifies as an intended third-party beneficiary if the
parties to the contract intended to give that outside party the benefit
of the contract's promised performance. 212 Both parties to the
contract must undertake a clear and direct obligation to the third
party;213 it is not enough to show a party will derive some benefit
from the contract. 214 Although other parties may be affected by
contracts (incidental beneficiaries), only intended third-party
beneficiaries have rights under a contract for their benefit.215
Courts have found third-party beneficiaries to exist in a wide
variety of contractual situations,216 affecting a wide variety of
relationships between the parties to the contract and the would-be
third-party beneficiary. For instance, courts have often found
tenants of buildings, whether commercial or residential, to be thirdparty beneficiaries of contracts to improve, expand, or otherwise
physically alter the property.217 Children are always third-party
211. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 165 (8th ed. 2004).
212. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 302 (1981).
213. However, according to Perry v. Baptist Health, No. 03-1130, 2004 WL
1406092 (Ark. June 24, 2004), it is not necessary to name a person in the
contract if that person is a member of a class sufficiently described or
designated in the contract. Id. at *3.
214. Id.; Collins v. Anthem Health Plans, Inc., No. XOICV990156198S, 2000
WL 1768354, at *8 (Conn. Super. Ct. Oct. 31, 2000) ("[TJhird-party beneficiary
status is not established merely by showing that one will receive some benefit
from the contract or that one is affected by it.").
215. See, e.g., Pelham v. Griesheimer, 440 N.E.2d 96, 98 (Ill. 1982) (holding
that intent to benefit the third party must be the primary or direct purpose of
the transaction or relationship and is "an indispensable element of a third-party
beneficiary theory of recovery").
216. See, e.g., Little Rock Wastewater Util. v. Larry Moyer Trucking, Inc.,
902 S.W.2d 760, 763-64 (Ark. 1995) (holding that a highway construction firm
was a third-party beneficiary of a contract between the state and utility
company when utility company took too long to finish a job, thus delaying the
construction company's work); Gateway Co. v. DiNoia, 654 A.2d 342, 347 (Conn.
1995) (considering a landlord to be a third-party beneficiary to agreement
assigning a lease from one tenant to another); Tredrea v. Anesthesia &
Analgesia, P.C., 584 N.W.2d 276, 282 (Iowa 1998) (holding that independent
anesthesiologists were third-party beneficiaries to a contract hospital entered
into with anesthesia partnership, wherein hospital could use independent
anesthesiologists with partnership's consent); L.A.C. ex rei. D.C. v. Ward
Parkway Shopping Ctr. Co., L.P., 75 S.W.3d 247, 262 (Mo. 2002) (holding that a
shopper who was raped at mall was third-party beneficiary of contract between
mall and security company).
217. See K-Mart Corp. v. Balfour Beatty, Inc., 994 F. Supp. 634, 635-36
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beneficiaries of divorce settlements between their parents. 218
Patients can be third-party beneficiaries to contracts between HMOs
and the patients' doctors.219 It seems logical that a physician's
patients are necessarily a third-party beneficiary to any employment
agreement into which the physician enters.
While the benefit conferred onto a third-party must be more
than incidental, which normally entails that it be either financial or
legal in nature, contracts which by their nature affect the physical
well-being or health of an outside party will create a third-party
interest in that outside party.220 Because physicians are unique
among professionals in their overriding duty to attend to the wellbeing of those they serve, any contract which may affect their
employment, especially a restrictive covenant, will always deeply
221
From the Hippocratic Oath to the
affect their patients as well.
overall theme of the AMA guidelines, every action that a physician
takes in relation to her employment is undertaken for the benefit of
her patients, whether the patients are viewed as a class or as
222
individuals with individual needs.
Physicians are employed
almost exclusively for the purpose of treating patients, and thus,
inherent in every employment contract is an understanding from
both parties, the physician and the employer, that patients will
(D.V.I. 1998); Dist. Moving & Storage Co., Inc. v. Gardiner & Gardiner, Inc., 492
A.2d 319, 322 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1985).
218. See Smith v. Smith, 218 N.E.2d 473, 476 (Ohio Ct. App. 1964) ("As third
party beneficiaries the beneficial provisions of the contract ordinarily may not
be modified to their detriment without their consent and may be enforced by
them or for them."); Chen v. Chen, 840 A.2d 355, 358 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003).
Some commentators have advocated allowing students to sue as third-party
beneficiaries to the employment contracts between their teachers and their
school districts as well. See Kevin P. McJessy, Comment, Contract Law: A
Proper Framework for Litigating Educational Liability Claims, 89 Nw. U. L.
REV. 1768, 1807-10 (1995).
219. St. Charles v. Kender, 646 N.E.2d 411,412 (Mass. App. Ct. 1995).
220. See 9 ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 775 (interim ed.
2002) ("[Anotherl case may be supposed in which [a third party'sllegal relations
will not be affected but where performance will necessarily involve his person,
as where B promises A to render personal service to [that third party], such as
instruction, advice, or personal care ... . [Tlhe personal contact necessarily
involved no doubt makes it easier to show an intention on the part of the
promisee to make [that third partyl the beneficiary."). See also Gooch v. Buford,
262 F. 894,898 (6th Cir. 1920).
221. See Devine v. Roche Biomedical Lab., 659 A.2d 868, 870-71 (Me. 1995)
(holding that a patient would "clearly" be a third-party beneficiary of a service
contract between a laboratory and his doctor).
222. See AMA, Principles of Medical Ethics, http://www.ama-assn.org/
ama/pub/category/printl2512 (last visited Jan. 30, 2006); Nat'l Library of Med.,
Greek Medicine, http://www.nlm.nih.govlhmd/greek/greek_oath.html (last
visited Jan. 30, 2006).
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directly benefit from the contract.
While at least some courts have recognized the relationship
between physician-patient relationships and third-party beneficiary
status,223 they are not exact corollaries and granting third-party
beneficiary status has some downsides. Third-party beneficiaries
traditionally have a right to bring a claim for breach of contract. 224
Where the goal of a patient is continuity of care, it is not an
adequate remedy for that patient to have a right to sue a physician
or employer for a breach of contract. Allowing patients to sue for
breaches of employment contracts also jeopardizes the ability of
employers to make independent hiring and firing decisions. Another
difficulty with permitting third-party beneficiary status is that the
scope of the contract limits the scope of the beneficiary status. 225 If
courts grant patients third-party beneficiary status, employers may
attempt to avoid liability by refusing to mention the quality of care
physicians must provide, or by refusing to mention treating patients
at all. Additionally, under some states' laws, third-party beneficiary
status is currently unavailable to patients because state statutes
control the definition of beneficiary status. 226 Although granting
third-party beneficiary status to patients would force courts to
recognize the important physician patient relationship, courts have
been reluctant to grant this status because of the inherent problems
227
associated with third-party beneficiary status.
One case that illustrates the difficulties courts have with
finding the correct approach to the doctor patient relationship is
Daniel Boone Clinic, P.S.C. v. Dahhan. 228 In the case, Dr. Dahhan
signed a restrictive covenant-not-to-compete in consideration of his
employment with the Daniel Boone Clinic ("DBC,,).229 After the
cessation of his employment, two patients Dr. Dahhan had been
treating for chronic pulmonary and cardiac problems filed actions
seeking an injunction to prohibit enforcement of the covenant.230 A
Kentucky district court issued an opinion stating that the patients
and general public were third-party beneficiaries of the contract
between Dr. Dahhan and DBC, and that the patients were thus
223. Yeager v. Bloomington Obstetrics & Gynecology, Inc., 585 N.E.2d 696,
698 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992) (quoting Webb v. Jarvis, 575 N.E.2d 992, 996 (Ind.
1991».
224. See, e.g., Cherry v. Crow, 845 F. Supp. 1520, 1523 (M.D. Fla. 1994).
225. See Jeffcoat v. Principi, 17 Vet. App. 213, 219-20 (Vet. App. 2003).
226. Oja v. Kin, 581 N.W.2d 739, 744 (Mich. Ct. App. 1998) (citing MICH.
COMPo LAws § 600.1405 (2005».
227. See supra notes 223-26 and accompanying text.
228. 734 S.W.2d 488 (Ky. Ct. App. 1987).
229. [d. at 489.
230. [d. at 490.
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entitled to timely and adequate notice of termination oftreatment.231
The appellate court, however, took a different view. The
Kentucky Court of Appeals upheld the covenant-not-to-compete,
stating, "[g]enerally, such provisions are held valid, and not against
public policy unless the particular circumstances of the case would
cause serious inequities to result.,,232 When the appellate court
examined whether enforcing the covenant-not-to-compete would
233
cause serious inequities, it found none.
The appellate court
neglected the importance of continuity of care, saying the clinic has
a duty to provide professional care but not a duty to provide a
234
physician of the patient's choice or notice of personnel changes.
The court went on to .say that patients are merely incidental
beneficiaries to the employment contract between Dr. Dahhan and
235
DBC.
Clearly, the two courts were both applying the same general
law, and both were trying to determine whether the covenant-not-tocompete would violate public policy. However, the vague definition
of public policy and the fine line between intended and incidental
third-party beneficiaries leaves too little guidance for courts to
determine what is in the public interest. A better approach is for
courts to modify the rule of reason test to accommodate specific
analysis of the physician patient relationship under the public policy
prong.
Using the public policy prong of the rule of reason analysis,
courts should consider the impact restrictive covenants may have on
the patients of a contracting doctor in a more in-depth and multidimensional fashion. Such an approach would require a court to
make inquiries into the impact that enforcement of a covenant
would have on individual patients, as well as on the patients of a
physician challenging an agreement as a whole. As quasi-thirdparty beneficiaries to the employment contract, the impact of
enforcement of a restrictive covenant on patients would become an
important factor of public policy consideration. For example, a court
inquiring into the impact that enforcement of a restrictive covenant
against an oncologist would have on her patients as a class would
almost universally find continuity of care issues to be so vital in this
particular field that rescission of the covenant would almost always
be necessary. On the other hand, a court looking into that same
impact on a dermatologist would typically find diminished
continuity of care issues in that class of patients, making rescission
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 491.
Id.
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much less likely. By considering the public interest of a class of
patients, this approach also allows a court to consider the impact a
restrictive covenant would have on a physician's future patients and
the general medical needs of a community.
However, this third-party approach will also allow courts to look
at physicians' relationships with individual patients, providing for a
more nuanced version of the rule of reason that allows much more
flexibility.
Rather than make sweeping judgments about the
relative importance of a physician's specialty, this approach will
require a court to look at the nature of that physician's relationship
with his patients. 236 For example, a urologist mayor may not have a
large percentage of patients for whom enforcement of a covenant
would bring about disastrous healthcare consequences. 237
By
protecting the doctor-patient relationship courts will free physicians
to treat patients who require long-term care without fear that the
physician will be forced to ignore her medical and ethical
obligations. Elevation of the individual relationship between doctor
and patient will force courts to consider this impact on much more of
a case-by-case basis. Further, it will ultimately result in better,
more informed opinions that will simultaneously promote the wellbeing of patients and the economic interest of physicians. Such
interests are not, and should not be, diametrically opposed, but the
current tests that enjoy popularity among courts often treat them as
such.

236. Even the most progressive OpInIOnS regarding patient rights have
declined to look into the details of the contracting physician's relationship with
her patients. It is unknown, for instance, the extent to which the trial court
that issued the original Farber opinion relied on any specific information about
the contracting physician's relationships with his patients or the extreme
importance that continuity-of-care issues may play in the effectiveness of a
pulmonologist's treatments. See Valley Med. Specialists v. Farber, 982 P.2d
1277 (Ariz. 1999). The Duffner court apparently saw the plights of individual
patients or the nature of an orthopedic practice as irrelevant, as neither are
even briefly mentioned. See Duffner v. Alberty, 718 S.W.2d 111 (Ark. Ct. App.
1986).
237. For an illustration concerning physicians practicing pediatrics and
neonatology, see Dick v. Geist, 693 P.2d 1133 (Idaho App. 1985). This court, in
an indirect manner, was actually able to look at relatively detailed information
regarding the contracting physicians' relationships with at least potential
patients. See id. at 1136-37. While disruptions in patient relationships with
pediatricians and neonatal experts mayor may not result in major problems for
the quality of patient care, this court was able to look at the unique
circumstances that neonatal specialists in a rural area may experience, and in
so doing, voided the covenant-not-to-compete for public policy reasons. [d. at
1137.
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Contracts Should Be Efficient
Notwithstanding the deficiencies of the current rule of reason
approach, a one-size-fits-all approach to all restrictive covenants has
some support in the legal academy. Many law and economics
scholars argue that a more flexible rule will be confusing and add
ambiguity to the contract and its future enforceability.238 These
scholars contend that clear rules promote efficient transactions, if
those rules are known, and that contract law can be used to embrace
239
them.
Accordingly, these scholars would likely view this proposed
change to the evaluation of physician restrictive covenants as rather
dicey because the parties would have difficulty predicting in
advance, at least until the law became more settled, whether the
restrictive covenant would be valid. The current per se rule as
applied to attorneys and the rule of reason as applied to physicians
avoids this uncertainty. Currently, there does not exist much
ambiguity as to whether a physician covenant-not-to-compete will be
240
enforced, as most of them will be found reasonable.
My argument is that it is more efficient and fair to permit
restrictive covenants to exist with judicial limitations. First,
application of restrictive covenants to physicians seems to be a very
inefficient way in which to regulate competition for health care
services in a market. In a small community, there might be only
two dermatologists. If one tries to be independent but cannot
because of a restrictive covenant, then the community loses the
benefit of competition. Surely there are more competition-friendly
ways of protecting the investment an established doctor makes in a
new addition to her practice?
Noncompetition clauses are a result of two competing policies
that courts must grapple with each time a clause is litigated in
241
court: freedom to contract and a policy against restraint of trade.
A.

238. See A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAw AND ECONOMICS 13
(1983) ("[TJhe preferred legal rule is the rule that minimizes the effect of
transaction costs. These effects include the actual incurring of transaction costs
and the inefficient choices induced by a desire to avoid transaction costs."). See
generally RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw (3d ed. 1986)
(advocating the use of economics in judicial decision making); R.H. Coase, The
Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. LAw & ECON. 1 (1960). For a slightly different
perspective, see generally Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property
Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARv.
L. REV. 1089 (1972).
239. See generally POSNER, supra note 238. But see generally James M.
Buchanan, Good Economics-Bad Law, 60 VA. L. REV. 483 (1974); Jerome M.
Culp, Judex Economicus, 50 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 95 (1987); Mario J. Rizzo,
The Mirage of Efficiency, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 641 (1980).
240. See supra notes 51-65 and accompanying text.
241. See Empirical Study, supra note 41, at 486.
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According to some scholars, the closest courts have come to
balancing these policies for noncompete clauses is the rule of
242
reason.
The rule of reason approach is the best solution thus far
because it seeks to examine the many factors that contribute to each
of the competing policies. 243 Instituting the proposed solution of
adopting the quasi-third-party beneficiary status will take time like
any other solution. However, some commentators suggest that time
is quickly running out to bandage the wounds caused by restrictive
244
covenants.
Patient choice is being eroded and will likely continue unless
we stop treating physicians as we do salesmen and make a
concerted effort to enable patients to choose their physician
and remain a patient, regardless of the physician's
employment status. . .. The courts should not compound the
problem for patients by treating the 'freedom to contract' as a
higher public good than the right of a patient to choose and
remain a patient of a particular physician regardless of the
employment status of that physician. 245
With that consideration in mind, it is essential that courts
recognize the importance of the flexibility that restrictive covenants
require in the physician context, and examine covenants on a caseby-case basis. Although this method may be less judicially efficient,
it is more efficient in the long run if it can protect patient, physician,
and practice groups' interests more effectively.

B.

Judicial Discretion
A second criticism is that the enhanced public policy prong of
the physician restrictive covenant increases judicial discretion and,
thus, increases the likelihood that unfair or arbitrary results will
occur when courts review covenants-not-to-compete for their

242. [d. at 487.
243. As one author observed:
And, allowing reasonable restrictive covenants avoids the inequitable
results of applying the per se rule. The reasonableness rule enforces
the parties' expectations, rather than allowing one party to shift the
costs of complying with public policy to another party.
The essence of the reasonableness rule is an individualized
inquiry into the circumstances of the parties to the restrictive
covenant.
Draper, supra note 180, at 180.
244. See Leonard Opperman & Jason R. Burke, The Freedom of Contract us.
Patient's Rights to Choose: Non-Competition Agreements in Physicians'
Employment Contracts, RES GESTAE, Sept. 1999, at 24, 30.
245. [d. at 30.
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validity.246 Courts will be called on to determine the precise nature
of the physician's relationship with his or her patients and to
establish what will be a tolerable level of disruption to this
relationship. The decision to permit some physician restrictive
covenants to be enforced, even at the cost of some disruption of the
physician-patient relationship, necessarily requires an exercise of
247
discretion.
As in any case, a judge's particular sensitivities may
well determine the level of protection that a physician's patients
receive. Thus, the implementation of this approach will result in
some physician-employers believing that their right to contract has
been unfairly denied or circumscribed and in some physicians
feeling that their relationship with their patients has been
undervalued. 248
In the physician context, however, judicial discretion will not
lead to lesser protection of any physician-patient relationship. The
new approach creates the opportunity for the physician-patient
relationship to be viewed in a different manner setting forth a new
ceiling but not removing the basic rule of reason that exists today.
Thus, application of the enhanced public policy prong in the rule of
reason will not leave any physician-patient relationship less
protected than it is under current law. Instead, this new test would
provide a higher degree of protection in appropriate circumstances.
If anything, the existing rule of reason standard is more
troublesome because it concludes before any balancing occurs that
all physician-patient relationships enjoy little, if any, protection.
Judges under the new approach will have to use their discretion
to characterize the nature of the physician-patient relationship
involving a physician restrictive covenant claim. Although this task
is not an easy one and creates the possibility of an arbitrary
characterization of that relationship (and perhaps a denial of that
physician-patient relationship in individual cases), the benefits of
providing greater protection to the physician-patient relationship
more than compensate for the opportunity cost.
V.

CONCLUSION

The bond between a physician and her patient is one of the most
sensitive and important in American society. It is also one of the
most unique. The attitude that many jurisdictions take when
246. For a discussion of this line of legal reasoning in general, see Lawrence
C. George, King Solomon's Judgment Expressing Principles of Discretion and
Feedback in Legal Rules and Reasoning, 30 HAsTINGS L.J. 1549, 1559-66, 157375 (1979).
247. See Draper, supra note 180, at 180.
248. See generally Opperman & Burke, supra note 244.
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evaluating the degree to which this relationship should be protected
by law is at best inconsistent, and at worst incoherent and
insensitive. This does not mean that courts can also disregard
entirely the economic realities of practicing medicine in America
today. Courts must therefore also mind the sometimes competing
interest that the public has in promoting the profitable and stable
practice of medicine. Unfortunately, one thing that courts of all
jurisdictions have in common is the lack of a workable judicial
standard that can effectively allow them to walk the line between
these two competing public interests.
The vast majority of the sources cited in this Article, whether
judicial opinions or scholarly analysis, serve as evidence of the
current polarized state of the law in the area of physician restrictive
covenants, espousing either an outright rejection of physician
restrictive covenants in every instance or, alternatively, employing
an outdated analysis that is often incapable of achieving any
meaningful protection for the bond between patient and physician.
Somewhat ironically, taking sides in this tug-of-war will never solve
this problem. Instead, courts must be given the proper tools in order
to evaluate these complex issues in a complete and in-depth manner.
The third-party beneficiary analysis will serve as the perfect
instrument for courts to make better and more informed decisions in
the future.
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